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Careers Patterns in Greek Academia: Social Capital and Intelligent Careers, but 
for Whom? 
Nikos Bozonielos, Audencia PRES LUNAM, Nantes, France 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: To develop an account for careers within the Greek academic system. Historical, 
cultural and geographical features of the country have created a rather unique context that has 
apparently shaped the way academic careers evolve.  
Design/methodology/approach: The primary methods of data collection were retrospective 
participant observation and discussions in interview form with individuals who have had various 
types of experience with the Greek Higher Education system.  
Findings: The major factor that shapes careers in Greek academia is social capital or Know-
whom that operates within a broader cultural environment where institutional collectivism is 
extremely low, the in-group - out-group distinction is a major element, and political ideology plays 
an important role in everyday affairs. As a result academic careers in Greece are almost exclusively 
determined by membership, a priory or earned, to an “in-group” that is linked via blood, family 
friendship, business and political party ties. This “in-group” uses its social capital to control 
academic careers across all stages for the benefit of its members and at the expense of “outsiders”. 
Research limitations/implications: There are method limitations, but relevant concerns were 
largely alleviated by precautionary measures and the way data were utilized. Ethnography may be the 
most appropriate method to disentangle the way networks and social capital impact careers.  
Practical implications: Achieving substantive change, such as increasing meritocracy, within a 
particular sector may not be possible without consideration of the broader cultural context that 
encapsulates it.  
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Originality/value: The study is amongst the very first to unveil the “dark side” of social capital, 
and show how social capital may benefit the interests of in-groups at the expense of the collective.   
Keywords: Academia, Greece, careers, social capital, dark side, intelligent careers, know-
whom, career stage, national culture, in-group, politics,  political parties, nepotism, cronyism; 
corruption; organized crime  
Careers Patterns in Greek Academia: Social Capital and Intelligent Careers, but for Whom? 
The research examines careers in the Greek academic system to illustrate the mechanisms via 
which cultural and environmental characteristics have led to the particular patterns that careers 
follow within that system. The investigation employs the construct of social capital (Bourdieu, 1980, 
1986), which signifies the resources an individual has at his/her disposal by means of his/her 
relationship ties with other individuals or groups, and the notion of intelligent careers (Arthur, 
Claman & DeFillippi, 1995), which poses that maximization of career prospects is achieved by 
means of cultivating three competency domains: relationship ties, aspirations, and knowledge, skills 
and credentials. 
The contribution of the research lies on two aspects: (1) It provides an illustration of how careers 
are embedded within social and cultural systems, which frame career trajectories and essentially cage 
career actors by means of seriously restricting their latitude of action: as to be seen, there are only 
certain patterns of conduct for entry and progression within the Greek academic system, and these 
are mostly determined by a priori membership or not into a particular “in-group”. Deviations from 
such behavioural patterns for “out-group” members either preclude entry or seriously curtail 
probabilities of progress or even survival once into the system. (2) it illustrates the negative effects 
social capital can have for the collective (i.e., in this case the academia of a whole country, with 
probably repercussions on the country itself) when a particular “in-group” utilizes it exclusively to 
advance its own interests; and implies that the cultural context in which careers are embedded may 
influence whether social capital plays a benign or a malignant role within the collective. Social 
capital (Bourdieu, 1980) has been a popular concept in business and social science research over the 
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past twenty years, but it has been mostly considered in terms of its benefits for individuals, firms and 
the collective. The present work exposes the potentially negative consequences or “dark side” of 
social capital that has been mostly neglected so far.  
 
 
Setting the Stage 
Greece is a country with very long history, whose origins are traced well beyond one millennium 
BC. In addition, Greece has been granted the status of a country that offered lights to the rise of 
intellect, and is viewed as the cradle of modern western civilization (e.g., Barzum, 2000; Finley, 
1985; Norton & Company, 2010).  
What is known as modern Greece was founded nearly 200 years ago (in 1830 AD). It is 
important to note that the modern Greek State has been in existence over a longer amount of time 
than some countries that have played and play a dominant role in the political, social and economic 
affairs of the modern world; including Germany and Italy (e.g., see United Nations, 2013). However, 
and despite having a relatively long history as an independent country-state within modern Europe, 
Greece has failed at national level to make an impact in modern academic affairs, even if one 
controls for its size and other key factors, such as turmoil during its modern history (this observation 
excludes individual Greek academics and researchers who, predominantly from positions in foreign 
countries, have left substantial individual marks in their disciplines).  
In reaching that conclusion one simply has to compare Greece with countries of shorter histories 
as independent states and of comparable populations that have also gone through similar or even 
worse difficulties in their modern histories. Such countries, for example, include Czech Republic and 
Slovakia (being a unified single country, Czechoslovakia, from 1918 until 1993). These countries 
have shorter lifetimes than Greece and had also gone, like Greece, through devastation in the second 
World War (e.g., see Wilkinson & Hughes, 2003). In addition, unlike Greece, they had been under 
communist regime for nearly forty years in their recent history (1945-1992), a regime that has been 
Careers in the Greek Academia  4 
 
arguably connected to scientific isolation and economic stagnation (e.g., see Sakwa, 1999). 
Nevertheless, the academic communities of Czech Republic and Slovakia have achieved the entry of 
a number of their academic journals into Thomson Reuters indexing [formerly Institute of Scientific 
Information (Testa, 2012)]. Indexing by Thomson Reuters is arguably the strongest and most reliable 
indication for the quality and reputation of a journal (e.g., ABS, 2010; Harzing, 2010). The Greek 
academic community, despite the deep historical roots that place strong value on intellect and 
knowledge creation, has not yet even reached the stage to apply for Thompson Reuters indexing of a 
journal (in fact, there are very few academic journals to have been founded and edited by the Greek 
academic community, with none of them having achieved even minimal external recognition).  
Another benchmark are countries that are located in the same geographic region as Greece (the 
Balkan region) with shorter modern histories that have been under communist regimes and through 
traumatizing recent historical events, such as Croatia, Slovenia or Serbia. Despite that these countries 
have had gruesome recent histories [i.e., they were involved in war throughout the 1990s (e.g., see 
Malesevic, 2002)], their academic communities managed to develop journals of such quality that 
Thompson Reuters considered worth indexing. To the contrary, despite its remarkable history of 
intellect and the fact that it has been by far the strongest economy in the Balkan region throughout 
the years, the Greek academia has not achieved but minimal recognition by international standards 
(at this point it is important to reiterate that this holds for the Greek academia as an entity based, 
operating within and representing the Greek State Higher Education institutions, and by no means 
does it apply to individual Greek academics who, normally as expatriates or immigrants in other 
countries,  have produced and are still producing work that is internationally recognized).  
Two potential explanations ensue for the much below parity contribution of Greek academia into 
the international scene: academics who are employed in Greek Higher Education either (1) lack the 
capacity or (2) lack the motivation to engage in research-related activities that advance their fields. 
Both accounts apparently contain truth. What happens is that the careers system in Greek academia is 
ruled in such a way that, first, mostly precludes academics with abilities or potential to enter and, 
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especially, advance into the system; and, second, does not reward achievement in research or in other 
academic-related domains (e.g., excellence in teaching). Entry and progression into the system is 
mostly determined by a-priori membership into an “in-group” (that includes families or extended 
networks of families that are connected via friendship, political and business ties), with quality of 
work either being irrelevant or playing minimal role in the course of the career. This system 
essentially filters-out those with academic ethos and capacity and allows in only individuals who are 
already connected with the “in-group” or who are willing to conduct themselves in ways that earn the 
acceptance of that “in-group” who rules, or in fact “owns”, academia in Greece.  
The following sections inform on certain cultural characteristics of Greece that contributed to the 
way careers evolve within the Greek academic system. In addition, some information on employment 
legislation and the physical geography of the country will be provided, as these also have contributed 
and contribute to the formation of the labour market in Greek academia.  
Culture 
Cultural factors that bear special relevance to careers in Greek academia are: the “in-group -out-
group” polarization, the profile of the country in the cultural dimensions of Institutional and In-group 
Collectivism, the pivotal role of political ideology in life in Greece, and the very strong standing of 
academics in the Greek society.  
In-group - out-group polarization. 
Although the in-group – out-group distinction plays a role in virtually every culture, it occupies 
a dominant role in the Greek society (Triandis, Vassiliou & Nassiakou, 1968; Bozionelos, 2006). In 
particular, those who are viewed as members of the in-group (or “our people” according to the Greek 
expression), are treated with warmth and are provided with strong support and favoritism by their 
fellow in-group members; whilst those who are perceived as members of the out-group (or 
“outsiders”), are viewed with suspicion and treated with overt hostility (Broome, 1996; Triandis et 
al., 1968). In every-day life Greeks automatically categorize others as members of their in-group or 
out-group, and adjust their behavior accordingly (Broome, 1996). In addition, because neutrality is 
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normally interpreted as “out-group” membership, it has consequences that are similar to overt “out-
group” membership.  As a result, in- or out-group affiliation is a cultural imperative that plays major 
role in individual outcomes. Being part of the “right” in-group (which can be an extended family or a 
political party) can be extremely beneficial for social outcomes (such as career and life success) and 
vice versa. The in-group normally includes the immediate and part of the extended family. But in 
most cases it extends to networks of families with strong friendship ties between them due to 
common business interests and political ideology. In fact, according to some accounts Greece is 
owned and governed by a few thousands of families (Kavathas, n. d.; see also bankingnews., 2012).  
Institutional and in-group collectivism.  
Pertinent to the way careers evolve in Greek academia is also the profile of Greece on the 
cultural dimensions of Institutional and In-group Collectivism that were identified in the GLOBE 
study (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004). Institutional Collectivism denotes the 
extent to which people view their fates as inter-dependent with the fate of the collective and are 
willing to sacrifice personal convenience and wealth for the interests of the state and the community. 
Greece scores very low on this dimension (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii & Bechtold, 2004) - in fact, it 
falls into the last position of all ranked countries. This essentially means that Greeks consider their 
own fates as independent of the fate of the state itself, and they are unwilling to abide to laws or even 
ethical guidelines if they do not see these as directly compatible with their own personal interests. On 
the other hand, In-group Collectivism signifies whether members of a society identify themselves 
most closely with particular groups (which can include family, friends, or the political party to whose 
ideology they subscribe) rather than with the whole society or the state. Greece scores moderately 
high on that dimension (see Gelfand et al., 2004). In-group Collectivism is also linked with the 
importance attached to the “in-group” (being greater in countries towards the high pole of the 
dimension), which, as seen, is a particularly pronounced cultural feature in the Greek society.  
The profile of Greece on Collectivism, therefore, suggests a country where people act in ways 
that put their own or their in-group’s interests (financial, power, influence, status, etc.) above the 
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interests of the collective. Institutional Collectivism is associated with greater social responsibility 
(e.g., Waldman, de Luque, Washburn, House, Adetoun, Barrasa et al., 2006), while In-group 
Collectivism relates to low trust at societal level (Realo, Allik & Greenfield, 2008) and greater levels 
of corruption and adoption of unethical practices (Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011). In line with these 
empirical findings, Greece ranks on the top of all 27 European Union countries on corruption, and 
finds itself below the median position in global transparency rankings (Transparency International, 
2012).   
Corruption means “misuse of office for personal benefit” (Soot & Rootalu, 2012, p. 32). Typical 
cases of corruption involve public officers who set operations with small networks of family 
members or trusted others, that is an “in-group”, in order to utilize  public resources for own private 
interests and/or favour relatives and friends into appointments. Given that the Greek academia is 
embedded into a cultural environment that is conducive to such scenarios it would be unnatural to 
operate in a different way. However, what is intriguing in this case is that the extent of the operation 
is such that the whole Greek academia is in essence “owned” by an extended “in-group” that is 
composed of individuals who are connected with blood, family or personal friendship, and political 
party ties.  
The standing of academics in the Greek society. 
Another cultural factor of relevance is the extremely high standing academics enjoy in the Greek 
society.1 This is probably rooted to the strong role of intellect in ancient Greece that has descended 
as value for education and intellectual achievement into modern Greece. Indeed, having an academic 
position is highly prestigious for the individual and his/her family, who are respected in social cycles 
and by virtually all institutions. As illustration, in the most recent single-party government of the 
country (2009-2011) a substantial number of Secretary Generals and Deputy Ministers were 
academics who were affiliated to the governing political party. Hence, an academic position provides 
extremely strong societal status, opportunities to influence affairs, and financial opportunities.  
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Employment legislation and academic pay. 
The above cultural feature has, however, consequences that go beyond the effects of simple 
societal status and extend into actual legislation. Universities in Greece are attached to the state, and 
employees in them fall into the public sector. Employment legislation for the public sector in Greece 
includes guaranteed lifetime employment (e.g., OECD, 2012), and an excellent medical cover for the 
individual and one’s family. The privileges for academics, however, go much beyond. In particular, 
academics have always been granted elite status amongst civil servants in Greece (the title reserved 
for them is “special functions officers”). As such, academic pay is included into the “special 
payrolls” section in the State payroll legislation, which means that the wages of academics are 
protected against decreases in pay that may apply to other sectors (Journal of the Greek Government, 
2003).2 As an example, academics have been largely exempted from the severe salary cuts that have 
been part of the recent austerity measures in Greece, and to which all employees directly or indirectly 
connected with the public sector have been subjected (e.g., Carassava, 2013).3 This also contributes 
to the attractiveness of an academic career in Greece. 
However, another financial attraction to being an academic in Greece is the opportunity, always 
as member of the “in-group”, to use the Higher Education Institution and its resources as personal 
property in order to run one’s own personal business. For example, to run one’s own taught graduate 
degree or consultancy/practice. As to be seen in more detail later, taught graduate programs in 
Greece are at cases owned and run by particular individuals for personal financial profit. 
Political ideology and political party affiliation.  
Political ideology has been of paramount importance in the Greek society throughout the history 
of modern Greece and has been a major determinant of social affairs in the country. Its impact is 
reflected on the constant explicit and bitter conflict (further instigated by the profoundness of the in-
group-out-group mentality) between groups that espouse different political views. As an example, 
Greece was the only European country to resort to civil war (1945-1949) in order to settle the 
transition from the governance of the Axis occupation forces back to governance by domestic 
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political forces. That civil war ended with domination of the parties backed by Capitalist-led 
economies under the NATO Pact over the forces backed by Communism-led economies, under the 
Warsaw Pact. Not only did that war cause huge devastation (e.g., Carabott & Sfikas, 2004), but it 
also impacted and still impacts the social and economic life of the country. For instance, citizens who 
overtly opposed the conservative political ideology were officially persecuted (imprisoned or even 
executed) and excluded by civil service (which includes academia) and armed forces careers from 
1949 until 1974 or 1981, depending on the account one chooses to follow – though the system was 
not officially abolished until 1989 (e.g., Pakalidou, 2009). Political ideology and political party 
affiliation remains the only criterion for entry into the civil service (to which the higher education 
sector is attached), and for ascendance or appointment into senior positions in the public sector.4 
Until the early 1980s a prerequisite for earning an academic position in Greece was a proven family 
record of conservative political ideology; and since the mid-1980s a major asset is either membership 
or overt ideological support of one of the major political parties.  
Geographic context. 
Greece has an ideal climate (mild winters and tolerably hot dry summers), and boasts one of the 
largest numbers of days of sunshine (e.g., climatemps., 2013). The morphology of the country also 
has substantial natural beauty, an extended coastline with many accessible islands, and a “friendly” 
sea (the sea that surrounds the continental part of Greece is often described as a “swimming pool”).  
The above cultural (i.e., the standing of academics), legislative and geographic characteristics 
make an academic position in Greece very appealing both for Greeks who live in Greece but also for 
many Greeks with careers abroad. A factor that adds to that attraction is the strong ties between 
children and parents in Greek society (e.g., Dimou, 1975; Fokkema, ter Bekke & Dykstra, 2008), 
which makes many Greeks reluctant to move permanently abroad and those who are abroad to feel 
obligation to return at some point to take care of their aging parents.  
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Theoretical Background: Social Capital and Intelligent Careers 
The construct of social capital (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986) and the notion of Intelligent Careers were 
deemed helpful in accounting for the mechanisms that govern how careers unfold in Greek academia.  
Social capital signifies resources that include information, influence and solidarity that 
individuals have at their disposal by means of their relationship ties within a particular social 
structure (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Kim, 2013). Social capital exerts its effects by means of two 
properties, substitutability and appropriability. The former means that social capital can act as a 
substitute for resources the individual may be lacking, like credentials, skills and abilities, or actual 
output; while the latter means that the same tie can serve as a provider of multiple resources, e.g., a 
friend can provide us all, information, solidarity and access to influential others (Adler & Kwon, 
2002). Empirical evidence suggests that social capital enhances individual career prospects. For 
example, social capital increases the probabilities of entry into employment (e.g., Jokisaari & Nurmi, 
2005) and of career advancement (Seibert, Kramer & Liden, 2001). Since its early days, and 
especially after systematic research on its positive effects saw the light of publicity, social capital has 
been praised for its beneficial effects not only for individuals, but also for organizations and 
collectives. And career actors, managers and firms have been encouraged to include the building and 
exploitation of social capital into their agendas (e.g., Burt & Ronchi, 2007; Cotton & Shen, 2013; 
Prusak & Cohen, 2001).  
Much less attention, however, has been paid at the potentially negative consequences of social 
capital. And it is only recently that scholars have called for systematic attention at the “dark side” of 
social capital (Teagarden & Schotter, 2013; Van Deth & Smerli, 2010). Indeed, looking at sport 
governance, Numerato and Baglioni (2012) observed that social capital may indeed benefit particular 
individuals and groups who share and utilize it to advance their own interests (i.e., acquisition of 
power and material resources). However, this may run against the interests of the sector or the whole 
society who are in fact eventually harmed because inappropriate individuals advance into positions 
of power and because resources and prizes are not awarded or won on merit (Numerato & Baglioni, 
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2012). The present work contributes towards this direction, as it illustrates how social capital is 
utilized to the career benefit of an “in-group” at the expense of the “outsiders”, a situation that leads 
to the detriment of a whole key sector (Greek academia). Authors suggest that whether social capital 
has benign or harmful effects largely depends on the broader cultural context (Van Deth & Smerli, 
2010; Lin & Si, 2010). As to be seen, the present work attests to the legitimacy of that suggestion.  
Social Capital is partly incorporated into the Know-whom dimension of the Intelligent Careers 
notion (Arthur et al., 1995), which poses that for maximization of career prospects the individual 
must possess Know-why, Know-how, and Know-whom. Know-why refers to values, aspirations and 
interests that make the person attracted to a particular profession or occupation; Know-how means 
knowledge, skills and credentials that are required in order to follow the route the Know-why 
indicates; while Know-whom includes social ties that can facilitate the way towards desired career 
ends by providing access to needed resources (see also Parker, Khapova & Arthur, 2009). The notion 
of Know-whom has been developed specifically for application within the careers framework, while 
social capital is a more general construct that, amongst others, can also be of value in the study of 
careers (Baruch & Bozionelos, 2010). On the other hand, social capital is able to provide the 
mechanisms (the “why”) by which social ties contribute towards the achievement of career 
outcomes. For these reasons, utilization of both constructs was deemed necessary.  
The notion of intelligent careers can, however, serve an additional function in the study of 
careers in academia: it can provide an indication of which of those three competencies weights more 
towards career ends, and in what career stage each is most critical. By reason, in academia Know-
why should mostly play a role in the foundation stage, Know-how should be the dominant 
competency and should play a major role in all stages, and Know-whom should be only marginally 
important because entry and progression into academia must overwhelmingly depend on merit. 
However, as to be seen, in the Greek academia it is Know-whom that dominates by nearly fully 
eclipsing the Know-how.   
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Research Question: To identify the mechanisms that govern career progression and success 
within the Greek academia (RQ1), and to investigate the relative importance of Know-how and 
Know-whom (RQ2).   
Method 
A number of methods aided in the collection of the information for the empirical part. 
Retrospective participant observation. The author has held an academic position in the Greek 
Higher Education, which rendered him a complete participant. He documented events he witnessed, 
and he consulted these at a later time. Because he had not considered publication at the time 
observation took place , the term “retrospective” is appropriate (Bryman & Bell, 2003).  
Discussions that took the form of mini informal interviews. These, for example, were discussions 
with graduates of Greek universities who the author met in various settings (e.g., business, sports, 
social life), students enrolled in taught and research degrees in Greek universities at the time the 
author was serving there, currently serving and retired academic and support staff from the Greek 
higher education, or Greek academics abroad who either had held academic positions in Greece or 
had happened to have had experiences with the Greek academia. 
Though not devoid of limitations, the above methodology has a number of advantages. A major 
advantage is that being an active participant (i.e., another academic within the system) pretty much 
assures that what the author directly observed and was narrated or told was unpretentious and 
represented what actually happens within the system (e.g., see, for example, Numerato & Baglioni, 
2012). Furthermore, the fact that the author at the time had not considered authoring a manuscript 
adds to the validity of the method because it means that he did not have any motives or particular 
theoretical frameworks in mind that could in any way colour or distort his observations (Bryman & 
Bell, 2003).  
A potential caveat of the method pertains to the reliability of the author’s retrospective recall. 
However, studies suggest no difference in the reliability of retrospective and non-retrospective recall 
(Brockner, Konovsky, Cooper-Schneider, Folger, Martin & Bies, 1994; Miller, Cardinal & Glick, 
Careers in the Greek Academia  13 
 
1997). Furthermore, there are conditions that further enhance the reliability of retrospective recall. 
These include the absence of pressure on the person to recall, and the focus on the recollection of 
facts or narrated incidents rather than the author’s attitudes, beliefs or judgments at that time (Hardt 
& Rutter, 2004; Miller et al., 1997). Both of these conditions were met: the observer and researcher 
was in absolute control and at ease with his recollection endeavour, and what was recorded and 
recalled represented facts and events (whether observed by or narrated to him). In addition, having 
documented these as notes further increased confidence on their reliability (e.g., Middendorf & 
Macan, 2002). As a further step towards validity, the author chose not to utilize within the 
manuscript any cases that directly involved him. This reduced the probability of bias in the recording 
and recall due to, for example, emotional interference (Porter, Spencer & Birt, 2003).  
Published books, TV Documentaries, and Cases publicized in the media (e.g., newspapers or 
internet sites). Most of these cases are fully verifiable. These cases, however, were treated only as 
secondary data, and were utilized only for additional support, in the form of backing references, to 
corroborate facts, cases and conclusions that were based on personal observations of the author.  
All cases that appear in the manuscript, apart from two (Cases #2 and #8), were either directly 
observed by the author or narrated to him by at least two independent individuals (that sometimes 
included the actors in the cases) during his stay in the Greek academic system. As it will also be 
stressed below, these cases represent only a portion of the observations of the author. In addition, the 
author had personally encountered or co-existed with all focal individuals who are involved in these 
cases. This removes the possibility that the cases or the persons involved are “urban myths” within 
the system. Case #8 is special in the sense that the author did encounter the focal individual and 
many other individuals who are apparently involved, but he cannot confirm the trueness of what is 
widely alleged (i.e., that the undergraduate qualification was concocted). Nevertheless, the dates and 
institutions that appear in the official CV of the focal individual render that allegation plausible, 
hence, it was considered appropriate to include the case. Case #2 has been heavily publicized into 
virtually all media in Greece plus there is a record in the minutes of the Greek parliament.  
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It is critical to bear in mind that the cases that appear in the manuscript are only a representative 
sample of what the author observed or became aware of through narrations. The number of cases and 
situations the author directly observed or was informed/narrated about was multiple to what is 
presented in the manuscript. The cases that were chosen for inclusion in the manuscript were those 
that were judged to be most illustrative of the various aspects of career patterns in that particular 
context. But every such case must be viewed as a sample of many others the author happened to 
become aware of.  
Following from the above, what is important for the reader to keep in mind is that the 
widespread nepotism, familism and cronyism in Greek academia is a “truism” that is an undisputed 
fact within Greece. Indeed, there are scholarly books that have been dedicated to the phenomenon 
(i.e., Lazaridis, 2008a; Moutsopoulos, 2007), albeit published in Greek only. To these one should add 
an extensive prime TV documentary (Bloutsou, Kontargiri & Zarkadas, 2010). These sources, 
especially the books, have been heavily consulted and utilized towards the development of the 
comprehensive account of careers within Greek academia the work at hand attempted. This reiterates 
the point that the cases presented in the manuscript (and in fact the whole number of cases the author 
encountered and became aware of, which approach one hundred) should be seen as illustrations or 
instances of various aspects of a widespread phenomenon that is widely known and undisputable 
within Greece and by those outside Greece (i.e., Greeks abroad or non-Greek scholars who have long 
experience with the Greek academia) who are strongly familiar with the situation. This is very 
important because it dramatically reduces a potential criticism of the present work, which is the 
ability to generalize from a relatively small number of cases.  
To protect anonymity, actors are indicated as males, and disciplines have been changed. In 
addition, initials have been randomly generated from the Latin alphabet.  
Data were analyzed for insights they offered about careers in the Greek academia. The primary 
data were those collected directly by the author (observations and narrations to him). However, the 
scholarly books and media documentaries and reports were also valuable because they enabled 
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corroboration. Primary data were categorized according to career stages because that enabled a 
temporally structured account of career progression and its patterns. In the next stage, theories were 
invoked according to their capacity to provide explanations for the patterns indicated by the data. 
This led to the conclusion that the social capital approach along with the Intelligent Careers notion 
were the most appropriate frameworks to account for career progression within the Greek academic 
system; taking into account the cultural and legislative context in which this is embedded. 
Findings 
The reporting of the findings will be structured in the following way: First, some fundamental 
facts about the Greek Higher Education system in general and about the structure of the labour 
market for academics, including the direct involvement of political parties, are presented; because 
these play a vital role in the way academic careers evolve within that context. This will be followed 
by an account of the flow of social capital within the upper ranks of Greek academia, as well as 
between these, the political parties and the aristocracy of the country; and the meaning of this for 
employment and career progression within academia. Then there is a historical account of the 
circumstances that along with national cultural features led to the establishment of the “in-group” 
and its ruling of Greek academia. Subsequently, what is presented are the methods and mechanisms 
that the “in group” employs to control the entire career system. That part was organized according to 
the stage notion of careers because that enabled the development of a clear and comprehensive 
picture of the major issues at various key stages of career progression: from pre-entry and entry into 
the system until the late career stage and what this signifies for “in group” members and for those 
“outsiders” who eventually reach it. 
Basic Facts about the Higher Education System in Greece 
The only Higher Education institutions within Greece that are officially recognized by the Greek 
State are the institutions that are directly attached to and controlled by the State (Greek Constitution, 
Chapter 16). Non-State institutions were not even recognized as entities (i.e., did not officially exist) 
until very recently that the State allowed them to function as “centres of liberal studies” provided 
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they meet certain criteria (Journal of the Greek Government, 2011). However, the diplomas they 
grant are only recognized as certificates of attendance and do not have any degree status as far as the 
Greek State is concerned. This means, for example, that having a diploma from a non-State 
institution does not count if one applies for a position in the public sector, of which academia is part. 
The prestige and favourable conditions attached to academia in Greece apply only to State 
institutions and to academics employed within these institutions.  
 
The Official Structure of the Labour Market in Greek Academia 
The Greek academic system is controlled by the Ministry of Education that is, in essence, by the 
government. The system is inherently very complicated. Not only this, but there are also frequent 
changes in minor or major parts of it and frequent special decrees. It addition, it is accompanied by 
numerous minor regulations that make it labyrinthine. The system is fully centralized in the sense 
that all regulations and procedures are imposed by the government and the employer of everyone 
who works in academia is directly the State. This means that every action that relates to the internal 
labour market (e.g., creation of a new position, promotion, etc.) must receive the approval of the 
Ministry of Education. However, and as naturally happens in heavy bureaucratic structures, 
government administrators - even if one assumes that they are impartial - can only check whether 
procedures and other related issues (e.g., deadlines) have been adhered to and not their content and 
essence. For example, government officers can check that hiring met regulations with respect to 
deadlines, format of evaluation reports and composition of the electorate, but cannot check whether 
candidates were fairly accessed.  
On the other hand, the paradox is that controls for those in who are in the governance of Higher 
Education institutions are virtually non-existent. For example, there are no externally-based 
structures to supervise the rector (the equivalent of the rector in the UK system is the vice-chancellor 
and in the US system is the president) or the vice-Rector or the Senate. And because there is tenure 
for everyone in the grade of Associate Professor and above plus no external performance criteria this 
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means that those in the upper hierarchical levels of universities have basically no accountability.4 
The fact that those individuals have normally roots in the aristocracy of the country plus/or 
connections with the major political parties further diminishes any accountabilities they may 
theoretically face. Finally, it should also be noted that higher education institutions in Greece are 
exclusively run by academics. Support staff and functions (including the Human Resources function) 
have absolutely no substantive executive power and their role is purely operational.  
 
The involvement of political parties and the political elite. 
Another key fact is the direct involvement of major political parties into the life of the 
university, in line with one of the key cultural characteristics of Greece. For example, student 
representatives of political parties are members of the Assembly of each academic department, are 
invited to provide their views on candidates for academic openings, and are able to vote on certain 
issues (e.g., Mantzoutsos, 2008).5 In essence, this means that political party affiliation can “buy” 
favourable treatment for those in academia. For this reason those at the upper ranks normally have 
direct links with the governing party or other strong political parties; links that have usually assisted 
their career progression. In addition, strong links with major political parties facilitates 
implementations of personal agendas and offers “protection” (e.g., Moutsopoulos, 2007).  
The “In-group” of Greek Academia: Social Capital and its Flow 
Those who are in the upper academic ranks (to be referred to as the “Professoriate”) and in the 
governance of Higher Education institutions in Greece tend to be connected via quite strong ties: 
these are normally ties due to kinship, long-term family connections, affiliation with the same 
political party, and less frequently long-term personal friendship and mutual obligation; or in most 
cases a mixture of these. Hence, there is substantial social capital flowing through the medium-upper 
and top academic ranks of universities. In addition, that social capital extends to the political and 
economic elite, because, as noted and as will be described in detail below, academics in Greece 
generally tend to come from backgrounds of certain wealth and influence and/or to have some kind 
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of political affiliation (until the 1980s that had to be with the conservative or ultra-conservative party 
and since then with any of the influential political parties).  
Hence, the social capital the flows within the powerful ranks of academia can arguably be 
characterized as bonding social capital (see Putman, 2000): networks that connect ties are exclusive 
and homogeneous in the sense that they contain individuals with common family and educational 
backgrounds, as well as interest and affiliation with politics; and the binding material is norms, trust 
and reciprocity that are reserved nearly exclusively for other members of that “in-group”. On the 
other hand, there is limited bridging social capital (Putman, 2000) that is an absence of ties that lead 
to regular exchange of meaningful information, ideas and trust with “outsiders”, who can be, for 
example, doctoral students or Greek academics abroad who do not share similar aristocratic 
backgrounds or political connections or both. These “outsiders” are normally kept at bay from the 
boundaries of that “in-group”.  Social capital in Greek academia, therefore, partly operates as a 
mechanism of social exclusion that is of preventing those who are perceived as “outsiders” from 
entering into the system (Portes, 1998).  
Social capital provides the “in group” with information (e.g., potential job openings, budgets of 
the government, the “movements” of other individuals), influence (e.g., access to the government 
and/or the ministry of education, ability to influence a selection decision in favour of their own 
preferred candidate in another department or another university) and strong solidarity. The last is a 
product of the predominantly bonding nature of the social capital that flows within the “in group”, 
and is critical because it preserves the system: as long as actors honour the norms and conventions of 
this “in-group” they are allowed to carry out their personal agendas. These agendas may include: 
bringing or advancing people from their own family or friendly families into the academic system; 
establishing and running their own taught graduate degrees or other private businesses/practice for 
personal financial profit; non-conformance with basic obligations (e.g., not showing up for teaching 
or being absent for very long periods of time without any justification); and a number of other 
activities, such as forcing doctoral students to work as their secretaries and teach their classes (a 
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widespread practice), or utilizing resources of the institution for personal reasons. These in some 
cases are associated with grotesque events:  
B. M. has been a Lecturer in the university for two years. His office is next to the office of a 
colleague from another department who has a long tenure and the reputation of “being 
permanently absent from the university”. This means that he is never seen around and that his 
classes appear only “on paper”, that is they appear in the timetable and in the curriculum but 
they do not actually take place (this is not uncommon in Greek universities). B. M. has heard 
that this individual has ties with the government which, amongst others, means “protection” 
from the Professoriate; hence, this is not something he would like to “mess up with”. One 
morning B. M. hears some noise from the office next door and then a knock on his door. It is 
his office neighbour who worryingly utters “we have been burgled!”. B. M. was surprised at 
first because he did not notice anything unusual or missing from his office nor did he hear 
any other colleagues mentioning anything. Then he recalled that they had been burgled more 
than six months ago and everything became clear: simply his neighbour had not been into his 
office even for a single day for more than half a year. Not because he was on any kind of 
leave but simply because he was silently exempt from any obligations. [Case #1] 
 
And if someone tries to oppose, let alone change, this situation, this person normally faces the 
consequences of the solidarity resource of social capital: a united front that is composed of the “in-
group” and includes the Professoriate and the governance of the institution, and often the 
Professoriates of other institutions, government officials or political parties, and part of the 
aristocracy. If the previous case [Case #1] was “amusing”, the following case is less so because it 
grimly illustrates the power and solidarity of the “in-group” that controls Greek academia and the 
unaccountability that are in essence granted:  
Motivated partly by his personal values and partly by pre-election pledges of his political 
party about tackling corruption the Deputy Minister of Education in the period 2009-2011 
declared “war” at nepotism, familism and cronyism in Greek universities (Panaretos, 2010). 
As first step, the Ministry officially asked the rectors to provide all names and records of 
faculty members in their universities who belonged to the same family for inspection (Esos, 
2010). Given that this was an official demand of the Ministry, and that the employer of all 
academics is the State, one would expect that this demand would be satisfied with 
efficiency. Alas! The whole academia severely criticized the Minister for his tactics and 
accused him for intentionally slandering academia (Edu_gr, 2011a; ΚΣ Συλλόγου ∆ΕΠ 
Πανεπιστηµίου Αιγαίου, 2011). In addition, most rectors refused to abide to the request of 
the Ministry (Tsilivarakis, 2010). [Case #2] 
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The “outsider” in the case was the Deputy Minister, against whom the whole academia was 
united to protect itself from the seeming assault to the status quo. The academic “in-group” has 
strong connections within the major political parties. In addition, the ties extend to wealthy families 
with business tradition (that is part of the aristocracy of the country) and with further connections to 
the political parties (Moutsopoulos, 2007). This, in essence, grants them invulnerability even to the 
government itself, as the case profoundly illustrates.6 A similar thought of the Minister of Education 
of an earlier government (2004-2007) was contained by the “in-group” long before it translated into 
any action or even action intention (Kalimeri, 2009). If the Deputy Minister or the Minister has in 
essence no power, it becomes evident that it would be very unwise for an “outsider” from the lower 
academic ranks to report any wrongdoing: this would in essence mean the end of his academic career 
in Greece and potentially even more trouble.7 Even innocuous criticism that stays only within is 
sufficient to cause serious problems:  
S. P. was a very bright and hard-working young academic. He completed his first degree and 
doctorate in one of the central universities of Greece in Athens and after spending the 
necessary number of years as teaching fellow (due to lack of family or other connections) he 
was eventually elected in the position of Lecturer in another central University in his mid-30s. 
During the time he spent as teaching fellow it was of course necessary to include some 
influential members of that academic department as co-authors in his papers. S. P. had an 
outstanding publications record for the standards of the Greek academia, including being the 
leading author in one of the most heavily cited articles that appeared in a premier journal [he 
prepared the paper entirely by himself, but this is always a trade off those who are not part of 
the “in-group” have to make, that is to include members of the Professoriate into their own 
papers]. However, his advancement had been stagnant since. S. P. has the serious “flaw” that 
he is outspoken. He overtly talks to his colleagues or sometimes in the assembly of the 
academic department he belongs to about wrongdoings, lack of ethos and corruption within the 
system. Hence, there is no support from the Professoriate for promotion. Not only that but he 
has been refused basic rights, like budget for purchasing office and IT equipment. Because of 
obligations towards his elderly parents and because of being reluctant to expatriate himself 
after having invested more than a decade in this career S. P. did not want to go abroad.8 
Nevertheless, and as a reaction, he applied for and was offered a position in the rank of 
Associate Professor in a major European University (...!). He declined the position, but this led, 
with a couple of years further delay, to his eventual promotion to Assistant Professor. 
However, his problems were not over because S. P. had not learnt his lesson and continued to 
be outspoken. Now, being over his mid-40s he utilized one of the rights offered by the 
legislation and applied on his own initiative for promotion to Associate Professor. However, 
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the recommendation report of the Professoriate (this report is utilized by the electorate for 
guidance) was negative. To improve his chances, S. P. included a very powerful member of the 
Professoriate (descendant of a wealthy aristocratic family and with strong connections within a 
major political party) in one of his top forthcoming publications. This with the hope that that 
individual would use his influence (this means promises and threats) to persuade part of the 
electorate to vote in favour of his promotion despite the negative recommendation in the 
Report... [Case #3] 
 
The internal labour market: How the “in group” established itself into rule.  
An exploration of the formal structure of the internal labor market in Greek academia at present 
and historically - having always in cognizance the national cultural context - provides an explanation 
of how this “in-group” established themselves as complete rulers of the country’s academia. The 
process started decades ago, and has been instigated and nurtured by national cultural features.  
Pre-1982 structure. 
Since the establishment of Greek Higher Education in the 19th century and until 1982 only the 
grade of full Professor was in existence (similar to the system in Germany and in some other 
Northern European countries in that sense). The position of the Professor, accompanied by a “Chair”, 
was for lifetime. Each Professor had a number of Assistants under his/her rule. Before retirement the 
Professor would nominate his successor who would normally be one of the Assistants.  
Being an Assistant meant living for many years with the hope of becoming the “chosen one” to 
succeed the Professor. As already noted, until at least the early 1980s political beliefs were explicitly 
utilized for initial appointments in the Greek public sector, which encompasses academia. For that 
reason, academics were coming from families that explicitly espoused conservative political 
ideologies (people with “questionable” politics were not allowed into the system). In addition, these 
families tended to belong to the “aristocracy” that is they had a background of wealth and 
connections with the political elite. There were a number of reasons for that: First, only families with 
the appropriate (conservative or ultra-conservative) political beliefs and affiliations were allowed or 
provided support (e.g., loans and other forms of facilitation) to do business and acquire wealth. And 
because of the extreme prestige of academia many wealthy families wanted at least one of their 
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offspring to join academia. Second, the route to academia was normally very time consuming (it 
would take many years to acquire the necessary qualifications, years trying to become an Assistant, 
and many years as Assistant until one becomes a Professor); and this could be normally afforded 
only by people who had some financial means of support during that time. Third, the number of 
“Chairs” was disproportionally small in comparison to the number of Assistants, hence, it was often 
necessary to have direct connections with the government in order to “influence” the Professor to 
nominate one’s offspring instead of someone else; or sometimes to influence government officials to 
create a new “Chair” to accommodate their own offspring. Given that until the late1980s there was 
not even nominal transparency in the Greek government this was many times feasible. Even if a new 
“Chair” could not be created immediately, ministers or deputy ministers had the freedom to create 
intermediate posts for the “right” people. The following case is illustrative:  
D. G. was the offspring of a well-off family. His family sent him to the US to do his Bachelor’s 
degree and once he finished they encouraged him to do a PhD and follow an academic career. 
After completing his PhD he started as Assistant Professor in a US University. However, he 
found the conditions of work very demanding. In addition, he was missing the social life in 
Greece and the standing academics enjoy in the Greek society. Hence, he left without tenure in 
the US and returned to Greece. He targeted a particular central University because his family 
had family and political connections with the rector. D. G. expected to become immediately a 
Professor despite being in his early 30s and his credentials were those of an early untenured 
Assistant Professor in a mediocre US university. Alas, that was in the early-mid 1980s and the 
academic system had changed to include four instead of a single grade (see below). 
Furthermore, the political situation was changing and the socialist party that was now into 
power was working to have its share of people in academia. Moreover, D. G. found out that 
there were others with strong connections and similar aspirations to him, which meant a long 
“pecking-order”. Indeed, the family friend told him that it would be impossible to give him a 
full Professorship immediately. Nevertheless, D. G. was not prepared to compromise. His 
family background had instilled to him the audacity required to perform the following steps: 
first, he approached others who were in the same situation as him (in fact, many of them were 
coming from families that had business or friendship ties with each other); and then all of them 
went directly to the Minister of Education to express their demand. The Minister view that case 
as an opportunity to place people from his own political party into top academic ranks as well. 
Hence, he created overnight the position of “Special Scientist”. That position was defined in 
such a way that its holders would be paid nearly professorial salaries and would become 
preferential candidates for full Professorships once such positions were created or became 
vacant... Within a couple of years D. G. was a full Professor. [Case #4] 
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Post-1982 structure. 
In 1982, the newly elected self-proclaimed socialist government in Greece changed the academic 
system (mostly in line with the Anglo-Saxon standards), adopting four grades: Lecturer, Assistant 
Professor, Associate Professor, and Professor. This system exists until now (though the recent yet-to-
be-implemented legislation eliminates the Lecturer grade). It includes a tenure system for the lower 
two grades. Individuals who enter in any of these grades have to earn tenure. This has to be achieved 
within six years if one enters as Lecturer and within three years if one enters as Assistant Professor 
(however, given that processes are sluggish the actual time is normally nine to ten and four to five 
years, respectively). There is automatic tenure if one enters the system at the grade of Associate 
Professor or Professor. This, therefore, makes the entry point into the system critical.  
Entry into and progress within the system (i.e., hiring, promotion from one grade to the next, and 
tenure) are accorded by decisions made by an “electorate”. The electorate is composed two thirds by 
academics who belong to the academic department concerned and one third by “external” academics. 
All members of the electorate must specialize in subject areas (“descriptions of cognitive domain” is 
the direct translation of the term) that are identical or adjacent to the position under consideration. To 
illustrate with a simple example, if an Assistant Professor position for the subject “Cell Biology” is 
open in a particular Department, two-thirds of the electorate must be members of that particular 
department and one-third must be composed of academics from other academic departments of the 
same or other universities. All these individuals must specialize in subject areas that are related to 
Cell Biology and must be at the rank of Assistant Professor or higher. 
However, for a few years in the 1980s there was a transition period, when in essence both 
systems, the pre-1982 and the post-1982, run in parallel. In addition, there had been many special 
decrees (as illustrated in Case #4) to fit the needs of particular people that belonged to or were 
affiliated with the “in group”. Such decrees are common until the present days. Apart from serving 
the interests of those few who are aimed for, these decrees may collaterally assist or sometimes harm 
“outsiders”. This may provide the opportunity to “in-group” members to claim “ownership” of 
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certain individuals by means of helping them out in predicaments caused by such decrees, as the 
following case illustrates:  
K. M. was coming from a middle class family and once he completed his doctoral degree 
abroad and returned to Greece in the early 1980s. Taking advantage of the expansion of 
academia that the socialist government had introduced he gained a Lecturer position in a 
central university. Though an outspoken supporter of socialist ideology he had no formal 
connections with the ruling political party. Furthermore, not being part of the “in group” he 
was not being kept informed about new regulations and decrees. As a consequence, one day 
and “out of the blue” he found out that a special degree had been introduced that asked 
Lecturers to apply for intention to earn tenure. Missing the deadline led to dismissal. As the 
deadline was very short (this is normally the case with such decrees because they are aimed to 
cater for the needs of particular “in-group” members or affiliates who are informed in 
advance about) he discovered that he had missed it. This, in essence, meant losing his 
position in academia. Given that he had no serious ties with the ruling party or to the 
government itself he was in anguish. As an act of despair he visited and begged a member of 
the Professoriate who was of similar age to him but had come directly as full Professor (see, 
for example, Cases #4, #11 and #18). Though he was coming from an aristocratic family and 
was affiliated to the conservative party that Professor agreed to help him out. Using his 
connections he managed to have K. M.’s application considered as it had been submitted on 
time, and saved K. M. This, however, implicitly meant that K. M. had to be loyal to him in 
the future and support any of his whims (including voting in favour for any candidates that 
professor wanted to bring into the Department or the University) [Case #5]   
 
Dynamics and Mechanisms of Control 
Before proceeding to describe the way the “in-group” rules the internal labour market in Greek 
academia, two important characteristics of the internal labour market need to be reminded. 
First, the system is fully centralized and its procedures are entirely designed and controlled by 
the Ministry. This means that in every step there must be approval by administrators in the 
Department of Education. Though approval is in most cases a formality (i.e., what administrators can 
pay attention at is only surface issues) this makes the process extremely slow. To illustrate, it is 
normal to take around two years from the point a new academic position is created until a candidate 
is chosen (“elected”), and then an additional one or two years until the candidate officially starts. 
Sometimes, however, with membership of or affiliation to the “in-group” this can be substantially 
“accelerated” (as, for example, it happened with all promotions of the focal individual in Case #10). 
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Second, the law requires that for every candidate an evaluation report must be prepared by a 
committee of three academics, at least one of whom must be external to the university where the 
opening exists. The law also requires that for cases that more than one candidate applies, candidates 
must be juxtaposed in the evaluation report. According to the law, the electorate (see above) has to 
take into account the report but they are not obliged to espouse its recommendation. Voting is open 
that is everyone knows what each electorate member votes. This is an important element in an 
environment such as Greek academia where a power culture dominates; which means that people’s 
actions are normally powered by fear or obligation (Handy, 1976).  
How Careers Evolve 
To illustrate how the “in-group” rules and preserve their power base, the stage notion of careers 
(Super, 1957) has been adopted because it allows inspection of what takes place in all key career 
stages, including preparation for entry, entry into the system, and progression into it.  The model 
developed by Baruch and Bozionelos (2010) was consulted because it both takes into account current 
developments and incorporates earlier models. Four stages were considered appropriate to focus on: 
Foundation, career entry, advancement and gradual change of roles. Foundation and entry were 
treated within the same section because in the present case they have substantial overlap. 
Foundation and entry.  
Foundation is a critical stage in career development because it provides fundamental values, 
motives and credentials towards a particular occupation or profession (Watson & McMahon, 2005). 
In the case of Greek academia, values and motives are instilled by the cultural environment that, as 
seen, places premium value to educational achievement and to intellect. Indeed, one of the aspired 
careers of many young people in Greece has traditionally been the academia. This provides the 
Know-why of the Intelligent Careers notion (Arthur et al., 1995).   
The Know-how aspect includes criteria in the form of qualifications and other achievements 
(e.g., publications) for obtaining an academic position. These should be distinguished into minimal 
credentials formally required and into additional achievements, such as publications, to earn the 
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position. The minimal entry credentials for Greek academia (i.e., Lecturer and above) are set by law 
and include: doctoral degree, at least two “original publications”, and some (not specified in terms of 
length) teaching experience in the higher education sector. The numbers of publications and years of 
teaching experience increase with the rank. Another condition is that the candidate must be fluent in 
Greek. Given that Greek is rare as a foreign language anywhere in the world, this in essence means 
that candidates are nearly exclusively native Greeks. Though most of these entry level requirements 
appear relatively unequivocal, the term “original publications” is open to interpretation.  The State 
does not, and cannot possibly, provide an exhaustive list or grading; hence, the meaning of “original 
publication” and the utilization of lists of not varies according to the “needs” of each case as these 
are seen by the “in-group”. This is illustrated in the following cases:  
The particular candidate for promotion from Lecturer to Assistant Professor in a semi-
central university has achieved eight publications since he started as Lecturer; six of these 
were first- or single- authored, and two had appeared in journals indexed by Thomson 
Reuters. This achievement is much beyond what is expected, and in fact the CVs of many 
full Professors in that University contained much less. However, according to some 
members of the Professoriate the candidate has not proved his “loyalty”. For example, he 
had refused to include their names in his papers. In addition, when he had been elected he 
was an active member of a major political party but he had lately detached himself from 
political activity. For that reason he lost his support from the members of the Professoriate 
that are affiliated with that party. Therefore, in either case he cannot be trusted with 
promotion. If not promoted the achievement of tenure will be under serious threat (failure 
twice to be promoted from Lecturer to Assistant Professor leads to dismissal). Hence, the 
idea is to give him a “first warning”. If this does not bring him to ‘his senses’ the next step 
will include a second failure that will lead to dismissal. For that reason the report 
inaccurately notes that the candidate has not published in journals that are indexed by 
Thompson Reuters and uses that to conclude that he has not achieved any publications since 
he started as Lecturer, hence, he cannot be promoted (...). When in the assessment session 
the candidate proves that this is not the case, that is he has two papers in Thompson indexed 
journals (plus many other publications), one member of the report preparation committee 
invokes a very short list of elite journals that a particular US university utilizes. The 
candidate has no papers in journals that appear on that list, which the assessor advances as 
alternative evidence that the candidate has no publications. The electorate overwhelmingly 
votes against promoting the candidate (...) [Case #6] 
 
Two candidates compete for entry into the position of Lecturer in a provincial university. 
One of the candidates has a very strong publications record that contains close to ten 
articles, including two papers in journals of the elite Financial Times List (“45 journals used 
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in FT Research rank”, 2012). The other candidate has a very poor record, composed of three 
papers in unknown journals (i.e., none of them indexed by Thompson Reuters or included in 
any known or unknown list). In addition, he is not the leading author in any of these articles. 
However, the former candidate has no connections in the Greek system (he completed his 
doctorate abroad) neither any political party nor family affiliation with the “in group”. 
While the latter is a blood relative of a powerful Professor in a central university with strong 
connections in the governing political party and the aristocracy. The report for the first 
candidate concludes that he possesses no first-authored publications in reputable journals 
that is “no evidence of ability to conduct research”. The report for the second candidate 
includes that “the candidate has proven his ability to conduct original research of high 
quality”. There is no need to inform the reader which candidate the report recommended, or 
which candidate was successful... [Case #7] 
 
The above cases are not extreme. There are many instances where newspaper or popular 
magazine articles, letters to editors of popular magazines, or even teaching notes for the students that 
have “counted” as “original publications” (for members or affiliates of the “in-group” that is).  
The above clearly suggests that by far the most important aspect in the initial career stages is the 
Know-whom. This is because the Know-whom substitutes for even basic credentials that the 
candidate may be missing or lagging behind. As noted, the top and near-the-top ranks are occupied 
by the “in-group” who share social capital (by means of blood or family friendship ties) that reaches 
further to the government, the aristocracy, and the political parties. In addition, those individuals 
control or “own” most of those at lower ranks who are not “in group” members, because if nothing 
else future progression of those at lower ranks is entirely in the hands of the Professoriate and the 
rest of the “in group” (see also Case #5). This means that when academics from lower ranks are 
included in electorates they have no alternative but to support the candidate who is favoured by their 
“owner”.  
Hence, the Know-whom largely operates as a pre-requisite condition for a reasonable chance of 
entry into the system. Beyond that point, the substitutability property of social capital (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002) enables to compensate for other qualities and credentials in the Know-how domain the 
candidate may be missing; echoing in this sense Coleman’s point that “[social capital makes] 
possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible” (Coleman, 1988, 
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p. S98). In fact, there are (apparently rare) cases where social capital has compensated even for lack 
of basic academic qualifications, like an undergraduate degree, which is something “sacred” within 
the Greek system: 
P. D. was the offspring of a well-off family with political connections. However, he had 
mediocre achievements at school, naturally was not able to pass the tough entry exams into 
the Greek university, and until his 30s he had not decided “what to do”. His family had 
enrolled him at a “centre of liberal studies” in Athens from where he graduated (as the 
reader recalls, degrees of these institutions are not acknowledged by the State). At that point 
he decided to become an academic. He went on to obtain a doctoral degree from a European 
university (the circumstances under which he achieved that degree remain “foggy”). 
However, according to the Greek legislation a doctorate from an accredited institution, as 
was that European university, is not valid if the individual does not have an undergraduate 
degree from another accredited institution. This rendered P. D.’s doctorate invalid. Hence, P. 
D. did not even meet the prerequisite conditions for an academic post in the Greek university 
sector. Nevertheless, close family friends were in the governance of a central university, and 
P. D.’s family was strongly connected with one of the major political parties, which also 
happened to be in power at that time. What they did was to find a connection that the liberal 
studies centre had with a bottom-ranked US university and to claim that the undergraduate 
degree and the Master’s degree had been earned from that university. They concocted the 
case such as the dates of undergraduate and master’s degree acquisition were very much in 
the past (when P.D. would have completed his undergraduate studies if he had enrolled 
along with his cohort) and that university was nowhere in the academic map; hence, in the 
unlikely event anyone tried to dig into the case it would be impossible to discover facts. 9 P. 
D. started as Lecturer and ascended gloriously the academic ladder, took high-profile 
positions in the governance of the university, and also run his own highly profitable taught 
Master’s course for many years. [Case #8]   
 
Strategies and tactics for “outsiders” who aspire entry. 
Because it is common knowledge that nepotism and cronyism plays a fundamental role in Greek 
academia (e.g., Kalimeri, 2009), individuals who aspire to an academic position chose one or all of 
the following strategies:  
(a) completing a doctoral degree in a Greek university. This enables establishment of a personal 
relationship with those already in the system. Many people who are connected with the “in-group” 
(e.g., offspring of Professors) follow this route because of its convenience. Indeed, around 80% of 
academic staff in Greek universities have completed their doctorates in the academic department they 
are serving (e.g., Lazaridis, 2008a). On the other hand, this route contains substantial risk for 
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“outsiders” because if the individual does not belong a priori to the “in-group” (e.g., does not have 
family or other kinds of links with the Professoriate or with the government/political parties) there is 
a strong likelihood that there will be either serious delay or no completion of the doctorate.10 
(b) For those who already have their doctoral degree, applying for positions as Teaching Fellows (the 
so-called “407s”), preferably in the University they aspire to earn a position. In this way they hope to 
gain exposure to the Professoriate, and to demonstrate that they have the appropriate “ethos” and can 
be trusted. Teaching Fellow positions are renewable on a 6-month or annual basis (renewal is not 
automatic but involves application anew and consideration against potential competition), are poorly 
paid (in essence they are teaching assistant positions), and involve “slavery” from the part of the 
holder. They normally include teaching in excess of what is formally contracted, plus the implicit 
obligation to include members of the Professoriate in any manuscripts the holder prepares. 
Nevertheless, these Teaching Fellowships are seen by many as a way to set the “foot in the door”. 
However, experience suggests that the success of the strategy is rather limited, and when it does this 
happens after many years or even decades.  
D. O. is in his mid-40s, married with one child. He had earned a first degree and a doctorate 
in Greece by his mid-30s. Since then, and for around ten years, he has been employed as 
Teaching Fellow in a central university. He is given a new contract every year. The major 
breadwinner in the family is his wife who works in a bank. He has had no family connections 
or other ties with people in the upper academic echelons of the Greek academia. For this 
reason it took him eight years to complete his doctoral degree, and he cannot imagine that he 
can apply directly for a Lecturer post. Nevertheless, he aspires to an academic career. Though 
he is a sympathetic to a political party, his standing in the party is not as high to grant him 
connections within the government or other influential individuals to press for his case. 
Therefore, he puts his hopes to the sympathy of the Professoriate, to whom he is doing every 
possible facilitation (including teaching hours beyond his contract, and adding them as co-
authors in the manuscripts and conference papers he submits). He knows that he has to prove 
his loyalty in order to stand any chances for a Lecturer position. Eventually a position opens 
in his subject area around ten years after he started as Teaching Fellow. However, he finds 
out that the nephew of a Professor in another Department is also a candidate. Though his cv is 
clearly superior to that of the other candidate he understands that the evaluation report will 
favour his competitor. He also knows that, even if that were not the case and the report were 
objective, the electorate would not dare to vote for him instead of his co-candidate. For this 
reason he decides to gather all his courage and talk to the Professors he has been working for. 
What he is promised is that ‘if it does not work out this time’ he will be the preferential 
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candidate when another position arises. This does not do much to alleviate D. O.’s concerns 
because he knows that he might have to wait five years or more until another position comes 
out. Eventually, the other candidate withdraws because he is elected in another Department, 
which he prefers (blood relatives to members of Professoriates have the luxury of choice; 
e.g., Pylosnews, 2010). Hence, the road now opens for D. O. Due to the sluggishness of the 
process he eventually takes over his position as Lecturer near his 50th birthday. Until then he 
continues to work as Teaching Fellow. He also knows that he will have to earn tenure, hence, 
the process of slavery and ingratiation will continue for long. Nevertheless, he is very proud 
because he now has a position in academia. The Professoriate also know that they have 
nothing to worry. He is not “one of them”, but he has proved his loyalty, he has been doing 
the teaching they are supposed to be doing for many years, and he includes their names in his 
occasional papers. In addition, and maybe most important, he is of absolutely no threat 
because he will be dependent on them at least until he earns tenure, which will take a 
minimum of ten years (he will be close to retirement by then).  [Case #9] 
 
In addition, earning a Teaching Fellow position is by no means an easy endeavour in itself. This is 
because the “in-group” frequently “reserve” such positions for their own people (e.g., offspring or 
other close relatives).11 They do it for two reasons: first, to acquire the minimal teaching experience 
required by law and, second, to be part of university life until an academic position opens. Another 
difference from the “outsiders” is that “in-group” members and affiliates stay in these posts for 
shorter intervals (until an academic position opens) and have minimal obligations.  
(c) Directly approaching particular members of the Professoriate to whom they promise 
“unquestionable loyalty forever”. This strategy is normally deployed by “outsiders” who possess both 
realism and “moral flexibility” and aspire at some point to gain acceptance into the “in-group”. The 
following case is illustrative: 
X. M. was in a tenure-track assistant professorship in a medium-ranked US university. 
However, he was encountering difficulties in meeting the demands for tenure. In addition, he 
was developing a drinking problem (whose side-effect, amongst others, was the occasional 
harassment of female students). Hence, he knew that it was imperative to move to a 
“hospitable” system. However, coming from a middle-class family he had no serious 
connections with the “in group” of Greek academia. He talked about his quandary with his 
family in Greece, and his father visited and begged a professor in a central university. That 
professor occupied key positions in his Department and in the governance of the university, 
and was notoriously known for his power and connections. The father promised the professor 
that his son would forever be his trusted servant. That tempted the professor, especially 
because the begging family espoused the same political ideology as him. However, given that 
X. M. was not connected to the “in-group” he could not be trusted immediately; hence, he 
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would have to start at the bottom to prove his loyalty. This was not an issue for X. M. , hence, 
he soon started as Lecturer. The choice of X. M. was proved excellent. Not only, as promised, 
acted as the professor’s loyal servant, but the professor also realized X. M. had very similar 
values to him. For example, he would have no issues with giving false promises, threatening 
or blackmailing in order to achieve his aims (e.g., inclusion of his name in the papers of 
others). Neither would he care about his moral reputation. For example, he was glad to find 
out that X. M. was boasting to his colleagues that “[he] rarely showed up himself in the class, 
and had never marked a single student script”. Therefore, he rewarded X. M. with efficient 
ascendance into the hierarchy, and X. M. went through all academic grades up to full 
professor in the shortest amount of time possible (around ten years) - keep in mind, he came 
as “outsider”. The professor also partly saw X. M. as a mirror image of himself, thus made X. 
M. deputy director in his highly profitable taught Master’s program, and later director of that 
program just before the professor retired. This meant that even from retirement he could trust 
that he would consistently have his fair share of the profits. That was a win for X. M. too, of 
course. Not only did he save his career and personal life, but also he has strong standing in 
the society, he is well-off, and his earned “in group” membership makes him virtually 
untouchable. [Case #10] 
 
 
Strategies and tactics of the in-group. 
It is also important to establish how the “in-group” controls the inflow of academics into the 
system. New positions are announced by the Ministry, but the grade (or rank) of the position is 
determined by each concerned Department itself.  For example, the government may decide to create 
two new positions within a particular academic Department of a certain university but the grades of 
entry (i.e., Lecturer, Assistant, Associate or full Professor) are in essence chosen by the Professoriate 
of the Department. Reasons for creating new positions are retirement, leave of a member of staff 
(rare), or “needs”.  
At this point it must always be borne in mind that there is flow of social capital between the “in-
group”, which includes the Professorate, government officials, and other major political parties. 
Hence, new positions are often “made to custom”. For example, a government official may have a 
family member or a friend or a member of the party who wants to start as academic. For this reason 
and by means of his/her ties to the university that official comes into agreement with the appropriate 
member(s) of the Professoriate to create a position especially for that individual (e.g., 
Piazzadelpopolo., 2010). In other cases, it is the member of the Professoriate who has a relative or 
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another type of tie whom he/she wants to bring in. Then in collaboration with the rest of the 
Professoriate he/she prepares a case for the Ministry or goes directly to his/her political connection in 
the Ministry or the government.  
The point of entry (i.e., at what academic rank one enters the system) is critical because that 
essentially determines future career development and probabilities to acquire some independence 
later. Considering that the system contains tenure, which to some extent frees the individual from 
overt dependency on the Professoriate, filtering in and out those who should and should not reach 
that stage is crucial. As noted, the process is very sluggish so even if everything evolves well 
promotion from one rank to the next takes a minimum of four to five years. Most important, because 
the first two ranks are untenured, entry into any of those ranks means total dependency on the 
Professoriate for the foreseeable future for those who are not “in-group” members. For these reasons, 
the general principle in hiring is the following: new people enter at the lowest rank possible unless 
they are “our own people”. However extreme it appears, the core of the mentality of the “in-group” is 
the following: “If it is feasible to bring a Nobel Prize winner as Lecturer and ‘our own people’ as full 
Professors then this is what we will do” (...).12 
A limitation to the point of entry for “in-group” members, however, is implicit controls between 
members of the Professoriate. For example, a member of the Professoriate may have the desire to 
bring a relative who has just completed the doctorate as Associate or Full Professor but other 
members of the Professoriate may oppose it because they consider that this will provide an unfair 
privilege (internal clashes in the Professoriate are frequent, but eventually there is return to 
equilibrium because they share interests and social capital, and see each other as part of their own 
“in-group”). Hence, relatives and friends of the Professoriate who have just completed their 
doctorates may also start at untenured ranks. However, the difference is that they enjoy very good 
treatment and a secure upwards career path. The “good treatment” is not only limited to career 
progression but also to provision of facilities. For example, it is not uncommon, especially in central 
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universities, for “out-group” academics to lack access to office (let alone personal computers, etc.) 
for years after their official start.  
Nevertheless, and despite the above limitation, there are still many cases of people with poor or 
“non-existent” academic records who have been brought directly into professorial positions, as the 
following case splendidly illustrates: 
R. T. was a child of very mediocre abilities and potential. Naturally, he failed abysmally the 
exams for entry into the Greek University and his well-off parents decided to send him to study 
in the UK. That was in the 1970s, Greece was not a full member of the EU then, and Greeks 
had to pay hefty overseas fees to study in the UK. Hence, there were mostly well-off Greek 
families that could afford this. R. T. managed to enter and complete a degree in a bottom-
ranked UK institution (a Polytechnic, which along with the rest of Polytechnics was named a 
University with the 1992 reforms of the British Higher Education). Then he enrolled for a 
doctorate degree. Rumours suggest that he plagiarized his thesis and was allowed to resubmit 
only in order not to make publicity. Afterwards he found a series of jobs as research assistant in 
the UK. By now he was in his 40s. At that point a family friend who was Head of Department 
in a Greek University and well connected with the government created a position of full 
Professor in his Department and had him elected. The subject area of the position was 
irrelevant to the area R. T. was pursuing research. R. T. was given by his friend a large office 
in the top floor of the university building with direct views to Acropolis. R. T. never taught a 
single class for more than 15 years. Either he did not show up in the class, or he was sending 
doctoral students or the Department would hire teaching fellows to cover for him.12 But he 
could enjoy the view from his office (when he occasionally visited) and the driving of his 
sports car around. Because that happened without any pretense it was to some extent 
scandalous even by the standards of Greek academia. However, no one ever dared to voice 
even a comment. The fact that his family friends were in key positions (e.g., rector and vice-
rector) in the university plus his rumoured strong links with major politicians and the 
aristocracy probably contributed into it. [Case #11] 
 
A major reason for bringing new people regardless of their CVs at bottom ranks is evident: 
ability to control new entrants and making certain that only the “right” people will eventually reach 
tenure much more advance further: having someone entering at the bottom in a system that lacks any 
substantive transparency means ability to exercise full control over that individual. Due to the 
attractions of Greek academia, it is generally feasible to solicit and lure talented or established 
Greeks from abroad. The initial conversation goes somewhat like that: [the Professoriate member is 
calling the “outsider” who is abroad]: “We find your work of very high quality and we want people 
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like you in our Department. An opening is about to come soon, but unfortunately the government has 
set it at [a rank much below the rank the potential candidate occupies at present or his credentials 
justify]. However, within three years you will have been promoted to full professor”. Of course, the 
promise is never fulfilled. Normally established academics who are brought this way into the system 
leave after a relatively short amount of time. Nevertheless, this provides benefits for the “in-group”, 
normally in the form of inclusion of their names into publications but also in the form of teaching 
relief. Because of the sluggishness of the system it normally takes two to three years from the first 
“call” until the person officially starts and then normally two to three years until the individual 
resigns. Inviting and bringing someone into the Greek academia is generally seen as a “favour” no 
matter the candidate’s caliber. Hence, the “outsider” feels obligation, besides asked explicitly, to 
include the name of the “in-group” member who “brought him/her in” into his/her papers.   
 “Outsiders” (i.e., not having ties with the Professoriate or the political parties or the aristocracy) 
at low ranks are attached to member(s) of the Professoriate in their own subject area [these are 
normally the Professor(s) who “brought them in”]. And they are entirely dependent on those 
Professors who in essence “own” them. This means that they have basically no rights and can be 
utilized in any possible way. This usually involves teaching and marking on behalf of these 
Professors or the rest of the “in group”, but also performing other tasks of importance to members of 
the Professoriate, as the following case illustrates:  
M. P. is a newly appointed Lecturer in a central university. He earned his PhD in a reputable 
UK university. A member of the Professoriate who runs his own taught Masters’ program in 
the University calls him and demands from him to write the report for the first external 
accreditation of his program. M. P. has knowledge of this process from his UK experience 
and is aware that such reports may reach 1,000 pages long. He estimates that it will take him 
around six months to prepare it. In the UK such reports are prepared by teams of specialist 
administrators under the guidance of the program leader. M. P. also knows that this demand is 
completely outside his job description, if not “illegal: ([unlike what happens in every other 
country of the world] Taught Master’s degrees in Greek universities are often owned by 
particular professors who establish and run these as private businesses for personal profit. 
These operations are “semi-illegal”, and the Professors who own them normally have 
connections of such nature that allow their activities to be tolerated). But exactly because of 
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this reason M. P. knows that he has no alternative. And he would better do a good job 
otherwise he will have no chances for promotion or tenure whatsoever (...) [Case #12] 
 
Able “outsiders”, provided they start at the bottom, are a necessity and this is something the 
Professorate realizes. The reasons are multiple: 
(1) able people who are untenured are necessary to perform tasks that are not performed by the 
Professoriate and the rest of the “in-group”. A major such task is teaching. Though the law as set by 
the government requires that all academics perform at least six hours direct contact instruction per 
week plus any other attached activities (e.g., course administration and marking) many members of 
the Professoriate or ever of the “in-group” at lower ranks engage in no teaching-related activities at 
all. Teaching and marking are normally carried out by untenured “outsiders”, or by PhD students 
who are forced to do it without pay (see also Footnote 9), or by Teaching Fellows (see also above) 
for whom, however, the budget is limited;14  
(2) People with ability to carry out research are needed because they add some kudos to the 
Professoriate by including them as co-authors in their publications. Despite no output requirements 
in the Greek academic system, most people in it do care about their image as scholars. One of the 
standard tactics is to approach untenured “outsiders” in their subject area and demand that their name 
is included into their papers (this tactic is also utilized with doctoral students and Teaching 
Fellows).15 The argumentation normally includes overt or implicit promises and threats. 
C. K. has been a Lecturer for around one year in a central Greek University. Before moving 
to Greece he was an Assistant Professor in an elite UK University. He wanted to move to 
Greece for personal reasons, and the Lecturer position was the only alternative he was 
offered. Recently he was given a “Revise & Resubmit” by a premier journal. Soon after that 
became known, two members of the Professoriate asked to see him. In those meetings both 
of them took lengths to explain to him why it would be appropriate to include their names as 
co-authors in the revised manuscript and why it would be unwise not to do so”. [Case #13] 
 
Regarding already established people, even if these stay only for a handful of years they use the 
Greek academic establishment as affiliation in their publications (and they normally include some 
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“in-group” members in these). This contributes towards the perceived reputation of the institution, 
and part of that reputation may wear off to the member of the Professoriate who “brought them in”.16  
(3) To avoid negative media exposure or to have some argumentative defense (however pretentious) 
when such exposure occurs. Occasionally the Greek media expose the nepotism, cronyism and 
endemic corruption (Bloutsou et al., 2010; Kalimeri, 2009, for recent examples). The by-product is 
that media attention sometimes coerces top officials to intervene (as in Case #2). Though such 
interventions normally end in vain or are just ostentatious, they can nevertheless create 
inconvenience. So it is better to take precautions and do “window dressing” when this is possible. 
Having some people who are worthy academics provides to some extend such “window dressing”.  
 
Controlling the outcomes of hiring. 
At this point one might query how it is possible to have absolute control over the hiring 
outcomes. The following tactics allow such control:  
(1) Academic openings in Greek universities are not widely publicized. By law, such positions must 
be publicized in the Journal of the Greek Government, which is not easy to obtain (it is available 
only in one particular point in Athens or needs a special account to access it from the internet). Even 
if one access it, however, academic openings is only one of the subjects covered, hence, these require 
substantial effort to discover. In the rare occasions that academic openings appear in any other 
publications, normally in Greek newspapers, they appear either after or very near the deadline for 
applications (this is not necessarily intentional, but normally a product of the sluggishness of the 
system). This is also crucial because the material required for a valid application is overwhelming. It 
includes, for example, ratified copies of all dissertations and publications of the applicant in numbers 
equal to the members of the Department to which the application is submitted.17 It also demands 
many official certificates (e.g., birth certificate, copy of criminal record, certificate of military 
service if male, ratified copies of degrees and certificates of attendance, etc.) that may be difficult to 
obtain on time – especially if someone lives abroad as it usually happens with “outsiders” who may 
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be a threat to “our own people”. If a single certificate is not “right” or missing this means automatic 
dismissal (this is a tactic that is utilized often by the Professoriates in provincial universities to 
eliminate “outsiders”). The “in-group” candidates are informed well in advance for the opening and 
have the application material ready. This means that in many cases the only candidate is in fact the 
“in-group” one (Lazaridis, 2008a; Moutsopoulos, 2007). 
2. By means of defining the subject area so narrowly that it fits only into the “in group” candidate 
and excludes virtually everyone else (e.g. Yiannarou, 2010). There are cases where the subject area 
of the position extends over many lines and resembles the title of a doctoral thesis or a narrow 
research subject. In fact, there is a dedicated expression that has evolved in Greece especially to 
signify this method: “taking the photo of a particular candidate”. What follows is the formal subject 
area (“cognitive domain”) of academic position in a central university: “Study (measurement and 
recording, processing, imaging, surveyance) of the natural space, along with analysis, interpretation 
and evaluation of the features of the natural and human environment, aiming at the configuration of a 
complete digital foundation and the participation to the creation of developmental programs with 
special emphasis to the land registry and earth information systems.” 
3. By characterizing in the evaluation report “outsiders” as being “out of the subject area of the 
position”. This is complementary to the previous method, and essentially excludes “outsiders” from 
competition regardless of their credentials. This method is utilized when the “outsider” is 
overwhelmingly superior to the “in-group” one.  
A clearly superior “outsider” is co-candidate with a family member of the Professoriate 
from another university for the position of Lecturer/Assistant Professor in Organizational 
Behaviour in a provincial university. This is “tricky” case, because when the opening is for 
two ranks the law specifies that priority is given by default to filling the post at the higher 
rank. No matter how much the credentials of the “in group” candidate were stretched he 
could not fit into the Assistant Professor position because, if nothing else, he lacked the 
minimal length of teaching experience required by the law. On the other hand the 
“outsider”, however scandalously his credentials were stretched downwards, fulfilled 
comfortably all criteria for Assistant Professor. So the committee was in serious 
predicament. At that point, a committee member observed that many of the papers of the 
“outsider” had appeared in journals that included the term “Management” in their title. This 
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resolved their situation. The “outsider” was deemed out of the subject area [because ‘[he] 
had not published sufficiently in the OB area but in the Management area instead’], so the 
only candidate that remained was the blood relative. [Case #14] 
 
And the following case:  
An outstanding “outsider” was candidate for the position of Associate Professor in 
Cognitive Psychology in a major University in Northern Greece. He had more than 
sufficient number of publications both in terms of subject content and in terms of journal 
title to fall within the subject area of Cognitive Psychology; hence, this was very difficult to 
challenge. However, the committee who prepared the Report noticed that the candidate had 
completed his doctorate in a Department of Social Psychology. Hence, the Report 
concluded that the candidate’s subject area was out of the subject area of the post, hence, he 
should not be considered. [Case # 15] 
 
4. By stretching the credentials of the “in-group member” upwards and the credentials of the 
“outsider” downwards. Case #5 provides an illustration of this tactic.  
5. Finally, it is not unusual to directly approach and overtly threaten (including physically) 
“outsiders” in order to withdraw their candidature (Moutsopoulos, 2007).   
Career advancement.  
Once into the system, there are normally three potential fates.  
1. For the “in-group” people who join at lower ranks a smooth and certain upwards path. This is 
normally accompanied, as already touched upon, by minimal requirements for output or contribution. 
These individuals are sometimes given positions of nominal responsibility that, first, involve prestige 
and, second, prepare them for assuming positions within the governance of the university later. There 
are two ways upwards: steady advancement through all ranks within the minimal amount of time 
required to stay in each. Or accelerated advancement. For example, someone who joins as Lecturer 
or Assistant Professor may be promoted directly to Associate Professor or Professor, respectively. 
This is achieved with the utilization of special paragraphs in the legislation (as we noted the 
legislation is labyrinthine). For instance, there is paragraph for direct promotion to Professor of 
people who have achieved “world-class” recognition regardless of their present rank or fulfillment of 
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other basic criteria (e.g., teaching experience). Exploitation of this paragraph has moved people 
within two or three years directly from Lecturers or Assistant Professors to full Professors.  
2. For “outsiders” advancement normally means a lengthy, uncertain and painful path. These 
individuals must (a) fulfill their own workload requirements for teaching and administration, and in 
most cases they also have to cover for the teaching of members of the Professoriate or the rest of the 
“in-group”; (b) produce significant research output (an endeavour that becomes even more difficult 
because of the heavy teaching workload and other demands they have to conform to (see, for 
example, Case #12); (3) keep the Professoriate and other “in-group” members satisfied and 
ingratiated. This normally involves (a) including their names in publications (see Case #13) or even 
preparing manuscripts on behalf of them, (b) conforming to demands that are completely outside 
their job description (as Case #12 also illustrates), (c) supporting their views and proposals in the 
general assembly, and voting for the candidates they wish to “bring in”. If they do not conform their 
prospects of advancement or even staying in the system drop dramatically (as Cases #3 and #6 
illustrate). 
3. There are some “outsiders” who in the way assimilate themselves into the “in-group”. In this case 
their advancement prospects improve dramatically and eventually their upwards paths resemble those 
of paragraph 1 above. Case #10 is representative of this category. A more efficient way, however, is 
to directly acquire the ties that bridge into the “in-group” by becoming a member of the same family. 
As the two cases below illustrate this has spectacular career effects: 
G. N. had worked for some years in the commercial sector, but in his mid-30s and after 
changes in his personal life he developed the ambition to become an academic. He had no 
family or other ties within the Greek academia. Needing a PhD and being aware of the 
dangers of doing a PhD in Greece he chose to complete it abroad (in a major European 
country) where he stayed for a couple of years afterwards to accumulate the required teaching 
experience. Upon returning to Greece he applied initially for lectureships without success. He 
then turned to the Teaching Fellowship route in order to set the “foot-in-the-door” and 
develop the necessary ties. Though in a couple of occasions he managed to take Teaching 
Fellowships in provincial universities, it became clear to him that the likelihood of obtaining 
a lectureship anytime soon was very slim. What made the situation grimmer was that he had 
not accumulated any publications record either. And it had already been a few years since he 
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had returned to Greece. In a press-conference he happened to meet the aging niece of an 
extremely powerful Professor in a central University. His marriage with her, soon thereafter, 
coincided with miraculous improvements in his career prospects. Almost immediately he was 
successful to earn a Lectureship in a provincial university and in the minimum time allowed 
by law he had become an Associate Professor. [Case #16] 
 
K. N. was a Lecturer in a central University. He was finding it very difficult to keep up with 
unreasonable demands for teaching and with the lack of resources, which had suffocated his 
research and had kept its publications record to near zero. He was realistic enough to 
understand that under this situation his future was much below sanguine. In addition, he had 
no time to enjoy his personal life. His predicament was resolved by marrying the daughter of 
the rector. Within a handful of years he had been promoted to Professor, and was heading the 
academic Department he belonged to. [Case # 17] 
 
Gradual change of roles.  
This is assumed to come at a relatively late stage of life and near retirement. At this stage, for 
example, after having worked hard and produced for long people may take a lighter workload and act 
as mentors for less senior colleagues (Baruch & Bozionelos, 2010).   
In the case of Greek academia, however, that career stage often comes either very early in life, 
for the “in-group”, or very late, for the “outsiders”. Or it may never arrive for the latter group. For 
many “in-group” members the tasks and activities that tend to compose academic work are not a 
requirement. This is either because engagement in these activities is not needed to progress in their 
careers, or because they reach tenure directly or in a fractional amount of time. After that point there 
are the following possibilities: 
(a) in some cases there is not even nominal involvement in the university, as Cases #1, #4, and #11 
vividly illustrate.  
(b) in most cases, however, they continue to be involved in the life of the university by means of 
holding posts in its governance or in academic departments/faculties. This preserves the status quo 
because it enables them, along with the other members of the “in-group”, to control the internal 
labour market and maintain their social capital. Many of those people also try to present an academic 
image in terms of occasional conferences and papers. This is normally achieved by means of 
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promises and threats to: “outsiders” who are already into the academic ladder, aspiring doctoral 
students and teaching fellows, and sometimes to gifted “outsiders” who are brought from abroad.  
(c) in some cases they maintain their involvement mostly from an entrepreneurial perspective. That is 
they utilize the institution as their own property in order to start and develop their own businesses. 
This is in the form of taught Master’s programs, and practice or consultancy. The strong demand for 
graduate education in Greece offers this opportunity. Unlike what happens in the rest of the world, a 
number of Taught Master’s programs in Greek universities are owned by single (or small groups of) 
academics who use these as operations for personal profit. This explains the seeming paradox that 
multiple taught graduate degrees on the same identical subject (e.g., three MBA degrees) may co-
exist within the same Higher Education institution – simply, they are owned by different individuals. 
This is feasible due to the virtually non-existent controls for the “in group” due to the strong social 
capital that flows between the Professoriate, the political parties and the aristocracy. Hence, there are 
academics in Greece who essentially operate as businessmen/women by “selling” their own Master’s 
program. The same happens with management/executive education and practice or consultancy (i.e., 
they use the resources, material and human, of the institution to deliver these for purely personal 
financial gain). To find people to teach and do the other types of work is simple: academics, 
Teaching Fellows or doctoral students who either do it for some pay or by force (see, for example, 
Case #12 above). The case below is quite comprehensive: 
P. G. was offspring to a wealthy family with strong connections in the then permanently 
ruling conservative party. He failed the entrance exams to the Greek university, but his family 
could afford to send him to the US to do his degree and then his doctorate. He started as 
assistant professor in the US but he soon returned to Greece where family friends in the 
Professoriate of the central University to which he aspired elected him directly in the rank of 
Professor.  That was in his early 30s. During his 30 years of tenure in the Greek university he 
never taught a single class session (personal accounts of graduates recall that though “on 
paper” he was teaching classes, in reality they “had never” – and they stress that ‘never’ – 
“seen him”: his classes were either silently exempted or were taught by doctoral students). 
Instead, he took a full-time position in the governance of a private college (to be clear: he had 
two posts: fully paid by the State University and fully paid by the private college) plus a 
number of other positions. At some point a minister – in one of the desperate, ill conceived 
and doomed acts to limit chaos and corruption in Higher Education – introduced a law that 
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staff in State universities cannot hold positions in non-State institutions. At that point P. G. 
had to eventually, and after attracting media attention, give up his other major position and 
officially keep only his post in the State university (because that had the most security, 
benefits and prestige). To continue his lavish life style he “opened” his own Master’s degree 
and his own consultancy service within the university using the resources of the university. 
Having political connections, family friends in the university governance, and taking up such 
positions occasionally himself provided P. G. with the liberty to have absolutely no 
accountability. Further, using artfully promises and mostly threats and blackmail on doctoral 
students and “outsiders” he was also able to see his name in some papers, so he could boast 
research activity. In addition, over the years he brought and developed in the university “his 
own people”, either family friends or others who were groomed by him for dependency and 
loyalty. In this sense, P. R. created a substantial personal kingdom and so he expects that 
when he formally retires he will still continue to reap part of profits. In addition, he expects 
that those “clones” of him will help his offspring into its way in Greek academia. [Case #18]  
 
Cases as the above are not unusual, especially in disciplines that are popular and provide ample 
ground for graduate education, and practice-related services, such as business-related disciplines.   
On the other hand, for most “outsiders” that last stage comes late or never (e.g., see Case #9). In 
the occasions that “outsiders” reach a position of independence or power (e.g., tenure or become 
Professors) “on time” (so they still have a substantial number of years ahead until retirement), there 
are two major possibilities:  
(i) Either they have been eventually eroded by the system, so they are now part of it and act in 
similar ways as the “in-group”, or  
(ii) they become “quixotically comical” in the sense that they live in isolation as outspoken critics of 
the system with no real power to change it and imposing no threat to the “in-group”.19 
The following case, albeit rather atypical, is very interesting because it reaches across both of 
these trajectories: 
M. M. was a bright and talented offspring of a middle-class family who upon completing his 
doctoral degree in a European country returned to Greece to fulfill the ambition to become an 
academic. That was in the early 1980s when the socialist party was still fresh in power. He 
was sympathetic to that party but not strongly organized as a member. In addition, the 
Professoriates in virtually all universities were still nearly exclusively linked to the 
conservative party. Nevertheless, using his limited connections and taking advantage of the 
expansion of higher education at the time he managed to earn a position as lecturer in a 
central university having spent a short amount of time as teaching fellow. After that, which 
could be seen as “success”, however, he realized that advancement or even survival would be 
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a very painful undertaking. Not belonging to the “in group” involved “slavery” as lecturer and 
a very uncertain future. Despite having a rather exceptional publications record for the 
standards of the time and context, he had been twice refused consideration for promotion. 
That made him uneasy not only because of his uncertain future but also because at that time 
he had some ideals of fairness and meritocracy. However, being very ambitious he concluded 
that he had no choice but to immerse into the system. Therefore, he deployed his remarkable 
cleverness to gradually develop and implement a career strategy that was based on two axes: 
first, formal affiliation with the socialist party (which was in power and enjoyed strong 
popularity). This provided him with some political protection, but also bridging ties to a new 
aristocratic cast that was being formed by those who were accumulating wealth due to their 
ties with the socialist government. Second, he cultivated of a positive relationship with those 
“in group” members who were roughly his age cohort. Some of them occupied positions in 
the Professoriate because they had come through the “direct” route, and some in the lower 
ranks due to the new structure that was implemented in the 1980s. In either case, that 
“bought" him some “immunity” against the whims of the Professoriate and also reduced 
resistance to his advancement. Furthermore, that gave him potential access to the conservative 
aristocracy that was still by far the most powerful in the country. In parallel to those 
strategies, M. M. took full advantage of the standing of academics in Greece and claimed 
“world expertise” in an area that was in very strong demand for specialist education (in reality 
he never published even a single paper in that area...). The protection that his formal 
involvement in politics offered him along with the tolerance of the Professoriate enabled him 
to gain access to university resources (human and material, such as teaching rooms) to start 
his own Master’s course but also to run his own specialist education and consultancy services 
within the university. At the same time, and being very articulate, he was exposing himself to 
the specialist print media, which provided him with additional routes to advertise his courses 
but also to further stipulate the image of himself as “world class scholar and expert”. The 
natural trade-off of investing time and energy in the implementation of the above strategy was 
of course inability to focus on genuine academic activities. However, he had long discovered 
that such activities do not pay off in Greek academia.  
Those strategies worked extremely well and enabled him to advance to the rank of Professor 
while concurrently he amassed substantial personal wealth. By that time he had been fully 
absorbed by the “in-group” and the Professoriate despite officially posing himself as a 
“renegade”. For example, apart from his own Master’s program, he co-owned Master’s 
programs with professors who were by-inheritance members of the “in group”. In addition, 
his treatment of others was typical “in group” and exactly the same as the treatment he had 
himself received at the start of this career. That included using doctoral students as secretaries 
and unpaid teaching assistants, and demanding inclusion of his name in publications. By that 
time he had in essence abandoned scholarly. His exclusive occupation was the running of his 
programs and the preservation of the status quo.  
However, being now in his fifties he did possess enough awareness to know that for all his 
wealth, power, and expert image to lay eyes, in reality as a scholar he was a “nobody”. And 
that turned him somewhat depressed. He attempted to correct this by associating his name 
with potentially influential work. For that reason he approached eminent Greek scholars from 
abroad whom he tried to ingratiate or to lure with promises for a position in Greece. 
Unfortunately that did not pay dividends because the mentality of those individuals (i.e., “a 
fair share of work is needed to deserve authorship”) was very different from the mentality he 
had long developed. That “failure” brought frustration that apparently was intense enough to 
lead to noticeably deviant behaviour. That included frequent “eruptions” in public against 
unprotected “outsiders” while on the other hand he would also publicly burst to denounce the 
lack of ethos within academia and in public life... That type of behavior eroded his credibility 
within the university. However, he faced no confrontation: “outsiders” were afraid of and 
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depended on him, while the rest of the Professoriate knew that he posed no threat while his 
interests were inter-whined with theirs. Nevertheless, that deviant behaviour led to isolation: 
neither “outsiders” nor “in group” members would interact with him unless they had an 
interest to pursue or a favour to exchange. And that further exacerbated his situation.  
To escape, and having ample free time at his disposal, he wrote a romantic novel that met 
substantial commercial success. This gave him the idea to pursue a parallel career as novelist. 
His career as popular novelist gave him considerable popular media exposure that allowed 
him to propagate a favorable portrait of himself to part of the lay public. In that period, and as 
a consequence of the economic situation in the county, major upheavals took place in the 
Greek political scene. As a result, the political party he was affiliated with fell abysmally both 
in parliamentary power and in public opinion. Having himself firmly anchored to a host of 
ties, dependencies and personal wealth, and also having apparently developed a grandiose 
self-mage, M. M. saw it as an opportunity to start his own political party in parallel to being 
academic and novelist. Though not taken seriously by anyone in his proximate environment, 
some “in-group” members and a number of “outsiders” formally declared support to it in case 
there were gains to reap. [Case #19] 
 
Most cases are not as complex. However, despite its convolution, the above case is highly 
illustrative of how talent is wasted and ethos is transformed within the cogwheels of Greek academia.   
The Scope of the Phenomenon  
What was presented above is the general average situation with respect to careers in the 
Greek academic system. The whole academia is essentially controlled, or better “owned”, by a 
number of individuals who form an “in-group” that is connected with strong bonding social capital 
due to family, business, personal or political ties whose resources (information, influence, solidarity) 
and properties (substitutability and appropriabilty) allows them to rule the system and their members 
to thrive. The Know-whom totally eclipses the Know-how, though the other way around is the way it 
should be. In fact, in some cases, whole academic departments are owned by single families. An 
illustration is the recently exposed case of a Department in a central university where all academic 
staff were either direct blood (e.g., sons, daughters, sisters, brothers) or in-law (e.g., brother-in-law) 
relatives (Lazaridis, 2008b; “Σωρεία Παρανοµιών” στο Τµήµα Κονωνικής Θεολογίας του 
Πανεπιστηµίου Αθηνών, 2010). And sometimes that extends to whole disciplines. For example, half 
of the academic staff in non-professorial ranks in the major medical schools have the same family 
name with members of the Professoriate (Adioristos, 2009), and this does not include family 
members by law (e.g., sons/daughters-in-law) who bear different surnames (Andritsaki, 2010) or 
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other “in group” ties (e.g., family friends).  If one considers that, via the social capital flow within the 
“in-group”, there must naturally be exchange of family members between universities (see, for 
example, Case #7], it clearly emerges that whole disciplines virtually “belong” to a small number of 
families and individuals affiliated with them.  
Discussion 
The work at hand focused on careers within the academic system of a particular country and has 
illustrated how social capital along with its resources and properties determine careers within that 
system. As such, the case of Greek academia provides strong support to the social capital approach to 
career success (e.g., Seibert et al., 2001; and see Baruch & Bozionelos, 2010). Beyond this, however, 
the present work suggests that social capital or Know-whom is in most cases a sufficient condition 
for career entry and success. On the other hand, exclusive reliance on accumulation of Know-how 
(e.g., publications and teaching excellence), which should presumably be the most valued resource in 
a knowledge-intensive industry as academia, is unlikely to pay dividends.  
The study also demonstrates how an extended “in-group” of individuals who are linked with 
blood, family, political and business-related ties controls an academic labour market of substantial 
size (there are well in excess of 40 Higher Education institutions in Greece with more than 400 
Departments). Career success within that system is predominantly determined by a-priori 
membership to that “in-group” or by willingness to accede in exchange for loyalty and service to its 
members.  
The case of the Greek academia also indicates that social capital may entail strong benefits for 
particular “in-groups” but at the expense of the collective, as illustrated by the under-achievement of 
Greek academia as a body. By extension, presuming that production and circulation of knowledge is 
critical for a country, this brings harm to the greater or “macro-level” collective, which is the whole 
country. This concurs with recent alerts on the “dark side” of social capital, which signifies its 
potentially negative effects (e.g., Van Deth & Smerli, 2010). It is worth noting that many elements of 
the “dark side” perspective are found in a monograph by a Greek academic (Lebesis, 1941/1990) 
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much before the advent of the concept of social capital and systematic career theory. Lebesis 
(1941/1990), who spent his entire academic career in Greece, observed how certain individuals and 
small groups unethically utilize their relationship ties to circumvent meritocracy and formal 
procedures in order to achieve personal goals such as accumulation of power, wealth and 
advancement to office. Lebesis argued that by means of advancing their personal interests these 
individuals concurrently harm the collective to which they belong, which is becoming increasingly 
handicapped in the long term. This mirrors the under-achievement of Greek academia as a body. 
The way careers evolve within the Greek system also largely accounts for the brain-drain 
phenomenon (e.g., Baruch, Budwar & Khatri, 2007), which is a constant plague for Greek academia. 
Indeed, Greece proportionally has one of the greatest numbers of expatriate academics. Being 
excluded by the system as “outsiders”, most academically talented Greeks choose self-expatriation to 
eventually become immigrants abroad (e.g., Boulia, 2012). And the proportionately few able ones 
who stay in Greece eventually focus their energy into developing, maintaining and extending their 
relationship ties rather than on core academic activities of production and circulation of knowledge; 
given that career progression is predominantly determined by Knowing-whom instead of by 
Knowing-how. This also partly explains why the Greek academic community abroad boasts 
substantial achievements, in contrast to the domestic academic community.  
Prognosis. 
 As seen, the present situation has roots that reach many decades in the past and is self-
perpetuated via mechanisms that are governed by cultural values (i.e., the low Institutional 
collectivism, the in-group-out-group polarization, the importance of the family, the standing of 
academics, and the key role of political ideology). These interact to render social capital detrimental. 
Issues that involve national culture are very difficult if not impossible to resolve (e.g., see Hofstede 
& Hofstede, 2005). Furthermore, even if one argues that imposing change in a whole sector, such as 
academia, is feasible (something highly disputable, e.g., Lewis, 2010; Quinn, 2012), the Greek 
academia does not operate in isolation but it is linked with the political life and the aristocracy, in an 
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inter-connected web. Hence, there is usually no incentive for meaningful change (because this would 
essentially mean voluntary decision of the “in-group” to discontinue its own existence). As seen, in 
the few cases the government (or better, single individuals who found themselves in the Ministry) 
has tried to act this has been in vain. In fact, in certain cases this has facilitated the task of the “in-
group”. An example is the legislative rule that a third of the electorate must be external to the 
academic Department a position is available, which was introduced relatively recently (in 2007) with 
the stated intention to limit the rampant nepotism and cronyism. In reality this led to a deterioration 
of the situation because it has granted to the “in-group” the power to legitimately intervene and 
control hiring and promotions everywhere; and, hence, to establish itself even in relatively “virgin” 
territories such as newly established provincial universities and departments, or in places where some 
kind of “revolutionary” activity could be discerned (e.g., Kalimeri, 2009). 
 
 
Limitations and Directions 
Limitations include concerns over the reliability of the author’s retrospective recall and the 
possibility that observations have the element of subjectivity. Though these should be kept in mind, 
the particular way data were collected (i.e., the author was a fully immersed participant without 
having the concept of pursuing a manuscript at the time) and recollected (i.e., from notes that 
recorded facts and events in which the author was not directly involved) alleviate many of those 
concerns.  
Another potential criticism pertains to the legitimacy of generalizing from a limited number of 
cases to a whole sector. However, as explained in length, the number of cases presented in the 
manuscript is only a portion of the cases the author observed or became aware of. In addition, and 
most important, the phenomena the manuscript uses as a base (i.e., widespread and endemic 
nepotism and cronyism within Greek academia) have already been documented multiple times within 
the country, and they do not compose an issue of dispute. Such sources of documentation were 
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utilized in the manuscript as secondary data for corroboration purposes. As already stressed, the 
aimed contribution of the work at hand was the development of a structured and comprehensive 
account for careers within a particular environment; rather than the discovery or disclosure of a 
situation. 
The present work adds to calls for focus on the darker side of social capital. Scholars (e.g., Lin 
& Si, 2010; Van Deth & Smerli, 2010) have contemplated on the role of the cultural context in the 
determination of the consequences of social capital. The work at hand suggests that, indeed, when 
the broader cultural environment meets certain characteristics then social capital may be to the 
detriment of a whole sector, albeit being instrumental of an “in group”.  In the case of Greece and its 
academia those cultural characteristics include the combination of low Institutional and strong In-
group collectivism, the in-group – out-group polarization, the extreme value attached to an academic 
position, and the importance of party politics in everyday life.  
Future research ought to further disentangle the inter-play between the mechanics of social 
capital and the cultural context in which this operates. For example, future studies can focus on 
academias that perform above parity, such as those of the countries mentioned in the introductory 
part, in order to identify cultural dynamics that may render the total effect of social capital positive 
instead of negative. For example, particular cultural features may render the social capital that flows 
within such academias more balanced in terms of bonding and bridging type. That may mean a more 
relaxed distinction between the in-group and the out-group, a pattern that does not foster nepotism, 
cronyism and isolating tendencies (see, for example, Putman, 2000; but also Garcia Albacete, 2010).  
Quantitative studies can also be of use. For example, future research can quantify the relative 
contribution of Know-whom and Know-how on career progression and other outcomes within 
various academias or even institutions within the same academia. And then utilize the ratio of 
contribution to predict differences between academic communities or institutions in output.  
Future research could also utilize network analysis (e.g., Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) to map the 
relational network of the “in-group” and develop a deeper understanding of how ties are deployed 
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and interact in its various activities; as well as map the territories over which the network of the “in 
group” extends. In this respect, longitudinal or retrospective data from network analysis may also 
provide insights into how the relational web of the “in-group” has evolved over the years (e.g., 
Mastrobuoni & Patacchini, 2012). This can also provide insights into, for example, how the networks 
of “outsiders” who eventually immerse themselves into the “in-group” transform over time.  
As seen, the findings suggest that careers within the Greek academia follow different patterns. 
There are “outsiders” who manage to enter the system and advance through their own merit 
following a very painful and uncertain route but without subscription to the “in-group”; while other 
“outsiders” choose to sign up to the in-group from the very beginning, or who are eroded in the way. 
In addition, there are individuals who chose from the outset not to engage at all with the system and 
instead pursue their careers abroad or within the very few non-State institutions that operate within 
Greece. The psychological make-up may play a role in the choice of the route one follows, and 
hence, which pattern one’s career conforms to. The construct of psychological capital (Luthans, 
Youssef & Avolio, 2007), which is composed of the resources of hope, self-efficacy, optimism and 
resilience, may be of relevance here. Psychological capital assists individuals to go through adverse 
social conditions at work while maintaining their focus (Wang, Wang, Fan & Gao, 2013). Strong 
psychological capital may, for example, be one of the qualities possessed by those “outsiders” who 
are able to maintain their efforts and survive within that system despite the multitude of adverse 
conditions they face. Another construct that can be of relevance is machiavellianism (Christie & 
Geis, 1970), which denotes the tendency to pursue one’s goals in duplicitous ways and without 
concern for ethos, for the truth, or for the wider community. Machiavellianism may be able to 
differentiate between those outsiders who subscribe to the in-group from the beginning or convert in 
the way from those who persist in the “righteous” path or who leave the system.  
It is also important to examine the meaning of the present findings for career theory itself. The 
present work suggests interplay between different levels. It appears that national cultural features, 
which can be seen as abiding to a macro-level structural approach, create the conditions for the social 
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capital dominance of career outcomes within the academic sector, which is a meso-level factor. This 
shapes individual careers (a micro-level variable). However, this last one also influences to some 
extent culture within academia itself (meso-level) but also structure (e.g., whether relevant legislation 
is actually implemented and even the nature of new legislation, what new positions are created and 
where), which is another meso-level variable. Future research could, therefore, examine and model 
the interplay of elements at multiple levels to develop a complete picture of the dynamic nature of 
careers.  
 Finally, the present work has methodological implications. If a quantitative approach were 
utilized (i.e., with scale measures of social capital and network ties, e.g., Bozionelos, 2003) it is 
unlikely that it would fully disclose the situation and the phenomena that are taking place. It may not 
have even revealed that social capital plays a strong role in career progression because the vast 
majority of those who are within Greek academia and enjoy efficient career progression possess 
strong social capital (which would mean low variance, hence, weak relationships); far less would it 
reveal of its nature and the way it operates. It was the in-depth awareness provided by participant 
observation and first-hand knowledge of historical and cultural facts that enabled a full 
understanding of the situation. This implies that methodologies that involve immersion into the 
particular context, such as ethnography, may be more apt at tapping the way social capital operates 
(see also Numerato & Baglioni, 2012).  
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Footnotes 
1 This is to some extent a paradox. That is the public is aware of the corruption levels within 
Greek academia, but people in such positions are still respected (though admittedly this reverence 
has been gradually declining). A plausible explanation is the robustness of intellect and education as 
core cultural values since the time of ancient Greece, which have not been eroded yet by the changes 
of modern society that are relatively recent.  
2 Despite what might be the common belief outside Greece, academic salaries in Greece are not 
low and are in fact, especially before the recent austerity measures, comparable to those in more 
affluent European countries like, for example, France.  
3To illustrate, the first, and only to date, time that academics saw cuts in their pay, in the vicinity 
of 10%, was the end of 2012 (Journal of the Greek Government, 2012) while the, multiple, pay cuts 
for the rest of the public sector started at the beginning of 2010 and have totaled until present nearly 
50% decrease in annual earnings.  
4New legislation voted by the parliament in September 2011 includes the element of trustees in 
universities and limits the formal involvement of political parties. However, this new structure has 
been met with fierce resistance, including resistance from the rectors themselves (Papamattheou, 
2012), and has yet to be implemented (Edopanepistimio.uoa., 2013). At this point it is important to 
note that the previous legislative framework (2007) was never really implemented, a fact that poses 
serious doubts on whether they will be any substantive rather than nominal implementation of the 
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new legislation. This should be also seen within the context of the whole Greek public sector, where 
there is a very wide gap between legislation or what is supposed to happen “on paper” and what 
happens in reality (Bozionelos, 2011). In addition, considering how the Greek academia currently 
operates, even if those structures are eventually implemented it is highly doubtful that any external 
control bodies will be impartial and will play the role they are supposed to play or will in fact be 
simply affiliates or members of the “in-group”. 
5See Footnote 4. 
6Another major case of corruption that had been surfaced by the media back in the 1990s 
involved a widespread operation of illegally transferring the offspring of academics and politicians 
from universities abroad into Greek universities. Greek universities have limited numbers of places 
for undergraduate study, hence, they require highly competitive entry exams (which are administered 
exclusively by the Ministry of Education, and they consist in essence the only impartial institution in 
Greece). Academics with the assistance of insiders in the Ministry of Education had been saving 
their offspring and the offspring of many politicians (plus those of anyone else who was able to pay 
the hefty fee involved) from the uncertainty and harshness of the university entrance system in the 
following way: first, having them registered in foreign universities and then subsequently 
transferring them illegally into their preferred faculties of Greek universities. The scale and time 
length of the operation had been enormous. However, and despite that a number of attorney generals 
were involved, the case was eventually hushed up and “archived” (Edu_gr, 2011b). This further 
demonstrates the untoutchability of the “in-group”, and justifies the argument that the “in-group” 
may in fact own the whole Higher Education system in Greece and not only its labour market. 
7
 Indeed, in the only case ever that individuals who were in the upper ranks of a Higher 
Education institution have been held accountable the whistle was essentially blown by people outside 
academia (they were the aged widows of ex-deputy rectors) while the evidence was unshakable  – it 
may be interesting for the reader to know that the case took nearly a decade to conclude, and in the 
process key individuals with incriminating knowledge sustained organized life-threatening physical 
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attacks while university archives that contained the incriminating evidence were arsonned (...) 
(Tsakiroglou, 2012). The direct relevance of that case to our subject (i.e., careers within the Greek 
academia) is that the career trajectory of the pivotal academic implicated is typical of career patterns 
that “in group” members enjoy: offspring of a wealthy and influential family with strong political 
connections, failed the entry exams into the Greek University, was sent abroad to acquire credentials, 
was given an academic position in the Greek academia immediately upon completion of his studies, 
and nearly instantaneously ascended (or better “jumped”) all academic ranks to become rector with 
the backing of three major political parties in the process... In addition, the case is illustrative of the 
profound sense of untouchability and unaccountability “in group” members possess (as reflected, for 
example, in directly using the university budget to purchase, amongst others, private Ferraris...). 
8Another major deterrent against going abroad for people who have already spent a substantial 
number of years in Greek academia is that leaving with less than 25 years of service in essence 
removes pension rights. Unlike most other countries where all pension contributions count, in Greece 
there is no pension entitlement if one resigns with less than 25 years of service.  
9Allegations for possession of fake doctoral or undergraduate degrees by “in group” members 
abound (e.g., Τα Νέα, 2010). The author did happen to hear about such cases, but he did not 
personally encounter those individuals whom the allegations/rumours concerned - though he had 
encountered some of the Professoriate members who allegedly backed these cases. And he prefers to 
be reserved on that matter. Nevertheless, given that the only people who may actually “see” the 
academic degrees as physical documents are members of the Professoriate and certain officials in the 
ministry, the scenario for occasional use of fake qualifications by the “in group” does not appear so 
unlikely. Recent revelations by the government itself that more than 10% of those in the civil service 
(of which academia is part) have been hired with fake degrees (news.in, 2013) adds some further 
plausibility to that scenario. 
10The doctoral degree system is Greece has even fewer controls and accountabilities than the 
academic labour market. It is not uncommon for doctorates to take twice as long to complete than in 
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other European countries (for “outsiders” that is) or for the candidate to eventually give up. Reasons 
include lack of attention by the advisory committee and, especially, forced involvement in other 
activities, such as teaching and secretarial tasks. Doctoral students who are “outsiders” are typically 
utilized by staff members as unpaid teaching assistants, who do most or all teaching and marking that 
is supposedly performed by staff members, and as secretaries. If the candidate has no links to the 
Professoriate or to political parties he/she has absolutely no protection (needless to note that there is 
no “grievance system”, but even if such a system existed “on paper” it would be only nominal). And 
in some cases doctoral students are asked to leave once they complete their fieldwork, which is then 
utilized by “in-group” doctoral students or staff members for their own benefit.  
11 It should be noted here that the Deputy Minister of Case #2 had also asked universities to 
provide lists with names of all teaching fellows, what courses they teach, whose teaching they cover, 
and the reason for that. Having himself insider experience as academic within the Greek system he 
was very aware of that phenomena and their scope.  
12It is worth stressing for the reader that reaching tenure by no means does it mean reaching 
“safety” for an “outsider”. Though it does come with substantial relief, tenure does not fully 
immunize against the “in group”. As noted, the legislation is labyrinthine with many footnotes and 
special regulations. Hence, someone can still face dismissal or other serious consequences for 
relatively trivial matters (that in many cases can also be “concocted”). This does happen when 
tenured (or untetured) “outsiders” are seen by the Professoriate as imposing real danger.  
13As in Footnote 11 
14As in Footnote 11 
15The new law on Higher Education, that has yet to be implemented, includes evaluation of the 
research output of universities. If the law is eventually implemented in substance and not “on paper” 
only the most likely logical outcome will be intensification of this phenomenon. 
16As in footnote 15.  
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17When the author himself applied for his academic position in the Greek Higher Education 
sector he had to hire special cargo to post the 40+ kilos that the application material weighted. 
18Another common characteristic of male “in group” members is either full exemption from 
military service, which is compulsory in Greece, or a seriously abridged or nominal service. How 
this is achieved must by now be evident to the reader. 
19The Greek adjective is “γραφικός” and does not have direct translation in English. It indicates 
someone who is quixotically comical because of his/her persistence to publicly reiterate the same 
points on the same lost cause.   
